Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 3

Article 7

2019

When Stop and Frisk Comes Home: Policing Public and Patrolled
Housing
Alexis Karteron

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alexis Karteron, When Stop and Frisk Comes Home: Policing Public and Patrolled Housing, 69 Case W.
Rsrv. L. Rev. 669 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol69/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019

When Stop and Frisk Comes
Home: Policing Public and
Patrolled Housing
Alexis Karteron†
Abstract
In response to programmatic stop-and-frisk, police killings, and
other recent controversies in American policing, many have called for
“smart policing”—the evidence-based deployment of police resources.
An often-heralded example of smart policing is hot spots policing, which
involves directing police attention to locations where crime and disorder
fester. It is difficult to argue with the logic of hot spots policing, and
this Article does not do so. Instead, it critically examines how the
Fourth Amendment operates when hot spots policing and similar
targeted strategies are used in a common setting: public housing
developments and their private counterparts.
Largely because of mass criminalization, Fourth Amendment law
allows police to lay siege to public housing and the people who live in
it. Public housing developments and their private counterparts have
historical reputations as problem places, and law enforcement has
subjected these locations to specialized policing programs for decades.
Given the low Fourth Amendment standards for stops, arrests, and
searches in connection with minor misconduct, that outsized attention
combines with the astounding array of conduct regulated in public and
patrolled housing to permit police nearly unfettered authority. Fourth
Amendment protections usually associated with the home are virtually
unrecognizable in these places. Instead, the Fourth Amendment fuels
the use of law enforcement as a tool of social control in public and
patrolled housing. As such, the harms of programmatic stop-and-frisk
are not remedied, but simply concentrated and localized. Policing in
public and patrolled housing thus offers a cautionary tale of the limits
of “smart policing” as an answer to abusive police practices.
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Introduction
It is axiomatic that the home enjoys the greatest Fourth
Amendment protection. Indeed, the “cult of the home” has led to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that protects the home more than
virtually any other location.1 Although this concept has long been
acknowledged to have greater resonance for those with more space
rather than less, the notion that “the home is the castle” is widely
accepted.2 But closer examination reveals that this acceptance does not
bear the weight of scrutiny. Fourth Amendment protection of the home
1.

Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
Fourth Amendment, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 905, 912–16 (2010) (describing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provides extraordinary protection
for the home).

2.

See generally 1 Wayne LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment § 2.3 (5th ed. 2012) (“[O]ne’s dwelling has
generally been viewed as the area most resolutely protected by Fourth
Amendment.”). This maxim apparently pre-dates even English common
law. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 197 n.3 (1993).
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is particularly circumscribed for some: residents of public housing and
private housing developments subject to routine police patrol.3
Residents of such developments and their visitors are subject to regular
and intrusive police encounters—ranging from “voluntary” ones to
stops, arrests, and searches—in and around their buildings based on
little to no suspicion of criminal activity. These places, and the people
who live in them, are subject to extensive scrutiny by law enforcement
in the hallways, stairwells, courtyards, and other common spaces of
their homes—encounters that are simply unimaginable in residences of
the well-heeled and wealthy.
This Article examines the intersection of the policing strategies
frequently used in such locations and Fourth Amendment doctrine to
argue that Fourth Amendment law plays a critical role in fueling such
intense police oversight and surveillance of public and patrolled housing
that they are sometimes effectively rendered occupied territories. Police
often label public and patrolled housing developments problem places
and accordingly develop programs aimed squarely at them. In addition,
they adopt “hot spots” strategies4 and focus their use on public and
patrolled housing. The primary way Fourth Amendment law
encourages these practices is its permissiveness of seizures and searches
in response to even the most minor misbehavior. The excessive
regulation of conduct in and around such housing developments—
achieved by statutes and ordinances that specifically govern conduct in
those locations as well as “house rules” and similar restrictions enforced
by police—combined with the freedom accorded police when they
operate in these locales effectively provides police carte blanche to stop,
arrest, and search everyone they encounter.
While hot spots policing strategies like those used in public and
patrolled housing has become wildly popular among American police
departments, legal scholarship examining the implications of their use
has not kept pace. Legal scholars have long lamented the limited
protection the Fourth Amendment offers to the urban poor5 and racial
3.

The term “public and patrolled housing” will be used throughout this
Article to refer to these developments. As used here, “patrolled housing”
refers to multi-unit dwellings subject to regular patrol by police or other
law enforcement officers, typically as a result of agreement between the
landlord and a local law enforcement agency. Some of these private
developments receive government funding, but many are purely private.
See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.

4.

See infra Part I(B) for discussion of hot spots strategies.

5.

See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 391, 401, 405 (2003) (observing that
“Fourth Amendment protection varies depending on the extent to which
one can afford accoutrements of wealth such as a freestanding home,
fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and vision- and sound-proof doors and
walls,” and noting that people who live in “tenements or other crowded
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minorities more generally.6 In the realm of police programs, they have
also examined and criticized “programmatic stop and frisk,” through
which police departments instruct their officers to aggressively stop and
frisk civilians.7 And, although there is extensive criminology literature
about hot spots policing, which primarily addresses the impact of hot
spots strategies on crime,8 there is a lack of legal scholarship that offers
areas” are “much more likely to experience unregulated government
intrusions”); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1265, 1270–73 (1999) (arguing that
“[p]rivacy follows space, and people with money have more space than
people without,” leaving the urban poor, particularly African Americans,
more subject to police scrutiny because “[p]rivacy, as Fourth Amendment
law defines it, is something people tend to have a lot of only when they
also have a lot of other things”).
6.

See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race,
Citizenship, and the Equality Principle, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1
(2011); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 946 (2002) [hereinafter Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth
Amendment]; Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented
Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543 (2011); David A. Harris,
Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659 (1994) [hereinafter Harris, Factors for
Reasonable Suspicion]; Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—
Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should
Race Matter?, 26 Val. U. L. Rev. 243 (1991); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 956 (1999); see also Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1272–73 (“Poverty
among certain population groups in certain parts of the country is almost
exclusively an urban phenomenon . . . . Poor blacks are more likely to live
in cities, surrounded by other poor blacks. If the law is tilted against the
urban poor, it is bound have a racial tilt as well.”) (footnotes omitted).

7.

See Frank Rudy Cooper, A Genealogy of Programmatic Stop and Frisk:
The Discourse-to-Practice-Circuit, 73 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 14–21 (2018)
(describing programmatic stop and frisk and distilling scholarly treatment
of the subject); see also Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors:
Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not
an Incident, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 159, 159 (2016) (describing programmatic
stop and frisk as “a deliberate program of stopping and frisking individuals
throughout [New York City], concentrated in certain areas, for the stated
purpose of suppressing crime”).

8.

See Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Constructing Hot Spots Policing:
Unexamined Consequences for Disadvantaged Populations and for Police
Legitimacy, 22 Crim. J. Pol’y Rev. 350, 358 (2011) (noting that “few
evaluation studies measure outcomes beyond crime rates” and that the
usual definition of “hot spots” makes “[p]eople in hot spots . . . ancillary
to the characteristics of the place itself”). As Tracey Meares has pointed
out, criminologists seem to assume—erroneously—that police always act
lawfully. Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference
Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It
Matters, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1865, 1874 (2013).
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a critical analysis of how hot spots policing and similar place-based
policing strategies interplay with the Fourth Amendment.9 This Article
fills the gap and explores the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when
police implement programs in public housing and private patrolled
housing developments. It concludes that residents and visitors of such
developments are uniquely vulnerable to police surveillance and control.
Moreover, it reveals that the long-acknowledged anemic Fourth
Amendment protections for the urban poor are especially weak in hot
spots; in the context of public and patrolled housing, that weakness
profoundly affects the everyday interactions between residents and the
police. Actions deemed lawful under the Fourth Amendment can leave
public and patrolled housing residents particularly vulnerable to
surveillance, police encounters and stops, as well as searches and
arrests.
By permitting such extensive dominion over the residents and
visitors of public and patrolled housing, the Fourth Amendment
facilitates social control of the largely impoverished residents of public
and patrolled housing, who are, at least in public housing, largely black
and brown.10 Similar to the criminalization of welfare recipients, who

9.

Rachel Harmon and Aziz Huq have touched upon hot spots policing in
their analyses, respectively, of arrest and stop-and-frisk practices. See
Rachel Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 307 (2016) [hereinafter
Harmon, Why Arrest?]; Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110
Mich. L. Rev. 761, 794 & n.130 (2012) [hereinafter Harmon, The Problem
of Policing]; Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing:
Evaluating Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 Minn. L.
Rev. 2397, 2422–25 (2017). In addition, it is worth noting that Jeffrey
Fagan has published two extensive empirical analyses of the New York
City Police Department’s enforcement practices in public housing. See
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing,
9 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 697 (2012) [hereinafter Fagan et al., Race
and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing] (evaluating the role of race
in determining level of trespass enforcement in public housing); Jeffrey
Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in New York
City, 13 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 415 (2006) [hereinafter Fagan
et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program] (analyzing the
impact of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
Drug Elimination Program on crime in New York City public housing).

10.

Over two million people reside in public housing, of whom approximately
67 percent were minorities in 2017. See U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Dev.,
Assisted Housing: National and Local Datasets, https://www.huduser.gov/
portal/datasets/assthsg.html [https://perma.cc/3E7U-WJ8Y] (last visited
Mar. 3, 2019) (follow “Data”; then follow “2017—Based on Census 2010
geographies” and select “U.S. Total”). Because policing programs in
patrolled housing (as defined in this Article) are not regulated or subject
to routine data collection, it would be impossible to determine the racial
makeup of patrolled housing. That said, there is reason to believe its
residents are also largely black and brown.
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are subject to substantial regulation of their conduct,11 the residents
and visitors of public and patrolled housing do not enjoy the same
freedom to move about their daily lives that most Americans expect.
Instead, they may find that even the most mundane rule violations
subject them to police encounters, which sometimes end with
detentions, jail time, and criminal prosecutions. The treatment of these
problem places in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is yet another
mechanism by which the Fourth Amendment permits profiling, with
place effectively allowed to become a proxy for race and class. This
dynamic undermines core Fourth Amendment interests and values,
including autonomy, the right to locomotion, and dignity interests. It
also demonstrates the limits of “smart policing,” which reformers
frequently call for in response to abuses like programmatic stop-andfrisk, and is supposed to use evidence to direct police resources where
they are needed most.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the rise of two
categories of policing programs that have been used to target public
and patrolled housing: those that are focused on housing developments,
sometimes funded by the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development, and hot spots policing more generally. Resting largely on
criminology scholarship, this examination is useful because it
demonstrates that the police focus on public and patrolled housing has
not occurred randomly or by happenstance; instead, it is the result of
a conscious effort to exploit the uniquely expansive authority police
have in public and patrolled housing.
Part II addresses the Fourth Amendment doctrines that work
together to limit protection against searches and seizures in and around
public and patrolled housing. Fourth Amendment law permits police to
subject residents and others who frequent public and patrolled housing
to routine and virtually suspicionless stops, arrests, and searches largely
because of “mass criminalization”12 in public and patrolled housing, i.e.,
the hyper regulation of behavior through the use of house rules and
similar standards. First, the standards for stops and high-crime area
doctrine function together to permit stops for virtually any infraction.
Courts have utterly failed to attach any meaning to the term high11.

See Kaaryn Gustafson, Cheating Welfare: Public Assistance
and the Criminalization of Welfare 60–70 (2012) (describing
administrative rules and punishments utilized in welfare system); Priscilla
A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the
Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1540
(2012) (exploring racially exclusionary practices that effectively restrict
access of poor black women to publicly subsidized housing in white
communities).

12.

As described more fully in Part II, Devon Carbado coined this term. See
Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of
Some of the Causes, 104 Geo. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2016).
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crime area, giving police officers extraordinary latitude to conduct stops
in any locations they define as such. This broad authority operates with
mass criminalization to provide police with especially expansive power
to conduct stops of people in and around public and patrolled housing.
Second, there is the Atwater rule, which permits arrest for “very minor
crimes,” i.e., effectively anything—including behavior regulated by
housing rules rather than criminal law.13 This rule grants police
expansive power to arrest, no matter how trivial the charge. Third, the
search incident to arrest doctrine leads to exploratory searches in public
and patrolled housing. The permission provided in Atwater to arrest for
virtually any offense can be exploited to facilitate widespread searches,
and some police departments invoke the exception to justify searches
of people in and around public and patrolled housing without even
making arrests. Several appellate courts have refused to suppress
evidence in this context, thus implicitly encouraging its use. Together,
these three doctrines legalize routine stops, arrests, and searches in
public and patrolled housing. They reveal that when police label places
as problems, police can exercise virtually limitless authority to seize and
search the people within them. Part II ends with a case study of New
York City Police Department programs that involve frequent patrols—
both inside and out—of public housing and private apartment
complexes. It illustrates how targeted policing programs operate with
the Fourth Amendment powers described in Part II to leave residents
defenseless against police surveillance and intrusions anywhere but in
the inner sanctums of their apartments.
Part III describes the costs associated with the aggressive stop,
arrest, and search practices frequently used in public and patrolled
housing, including the substantial disconnect between the traditional
articulation of Fourth Amendment values and the lived experiences of
people in public and patrolled housing. In addition, it details the unique
harms that flow from the use of such order maintenance tactics in
homes.
Part IV describes remedies for the severe limits on Fourth
Amendment protection for people who inhabit or frequent public and
patrolled housing. Some lie in the courts, while others in political bodies
at the state and local level. To the extent that some of the identified
Fourth Amendment issues remain open questions, particularly those
regarding the propriety of searches, courts should answer them in ways
that cabin the authority of police to seize and to search. State courts
and legislatures can also address these issues. State courts can interpret
state laws and constitutional provisions with an eye toward the harms
that unfold when police are given unreasonably broad authority to stop,
arrest, and search. In particular, state courts should be attentive to
whether their state constitutions even permit arrests for civil
13.

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322 (2001); infra notes 161–
172 and accompanying text.
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infractions. Legislative bodies should refrain from enacting laws that
unnecessarily criminalize conduct in public and patrolled housing and
enact affirmative bans on stops and arrests for minor misconduct.
Finally, local governments can both regulate police departments
directly and decriminalize housing-related infractions.

I.

Policing Programs in Public and Patrolled
Housing

Residents of public and patrolled housing have been in the
crosshairs of American police departments for over forty years. During
a period of tremendous change in policing and coinciding with a
newfound emphasis on place-based programs, law enforcement agencies
have developed both programs specifically targeted at public and
patrolled housing and hot spots strategies that have been frequently
used in such locales.
Over the course of the early twentieth century, policing was
successfully transformed from a purely political and often corrupt
exercise to a professional one that focused almost entirely on fighting
crime.14 Police officers, who had previously been driven by parochial
political concerns, came to be “portrayed as semi-automatic; officers
were described as loyally following rules and as largely under
administrative control.”15 The reform era did not, however, end all
problems with policing. Instead, significant critiques of American
policing practices emerged in mainstream discourse in the 1960s and
1970s. In direct contravention to the notion of police officers as neutral,
semi-automatic arbiters of justice, an American Bar Association study

14.

See Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform 53–56
(1977) (describing the professionalization movement in policing and its
focus on “administrative efficiency,” resulting in greater control of officers
by police executives); Anthony A. Braga, Crime and Policing Revisited,
New Persp. in Policing, Sept. 2015, at 3–4 (describing “pre-1930s
‘political era’ of policing” and emergence of the professional model of
policing); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in
Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum.
L. Rev. 551, 565–67 (1997) (describing the pre-reform era connection
between local politics and policing and the later reforms that created
“greater autonomy” of police); Sarah Waldeck, Cops, Community
Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One
Make Us More Comfortable with the Others?, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 1253, 1261
(2000) (“Reformers severed the close ties between police and local political
leaders, as well as between the police and neighborhoods they
patrolled . . . . Criminal law became the primary source of police
legitimacy, and reformers posited crime control and apprehension of
criminals as the core police function.”).

15.

Waldeck, supra note 14, at 1261–62.
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highlighted the enormous role of discretion in policing.16 Around the
same time, longstanding complaints about police abuse by communities
of color gained new audiences following rebellions in numerous cities.17
In response, three major approaches have come to dominate the
public debate about American policing since the 1970s: order
maintenance policing, community policing, and problem-oriented
policing.18 All three can and have been used to implement policing
programs that target public and other patrolled housing.
Order maintenance policing, also sometimes referred to as zero
tolerance policing, is an heir of “Broken Windows” theory.19 According
to Broken Windows theory, “police should address minor disorders to
strengthen police-citizen interactions, and consequently, informal social
control . . . . [S]igns of physical and social disorder invite criminal
activity. Disorder indicates to law-abiding citizens that their
neighborhoods are dangerous places, leading to their withdrawal from
informal social control and regulation.”20 By implementing this theory
through order maintenance policing, “police aggressively enforce laws
against social disorder with ‘zero tolerance’ that requires arrest for any
law infraction.”21 Accordingly, Broken Windows supporters promote
using maximum legal authority to stop, arrest, and search people who
live in areas with high levels of disorder.22 Of particular relevance to an
analysis of policing programs that target particular locales, it is worth
noting that identifying disorder may turn on the racial and class

16.

Id. at 1262–63 (citing American Bar Association, The Urban Police
Function (1973)).

17.

Id. at 1262 (citing Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (1968)).

18.

See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J.
407, 423 (2000); Livingston, supra note 14, at 562–63.

19.

Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and
Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457, 464 (2000).

20.

Id. (footnotes omitted); see also George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson,
Broken Windows, Atlantic (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/
ZL8A-7MG6] (“[A]t the community level, disorder and crime are usually
inextricably linked, in a kind of developmental sequence. Social
psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window in a
building is broken and is left unrepaired, all of the rest of the windows
will soon be broken.”).

21.

Fagan et al., supra note 19, at 467.

22.

See George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter?
An Analysis of the Impact of New York City’s Police Reform
(2001).
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characteristics of a location’s residents.23 The Broken Windows
approach has been subject to criticism from a variety of quarters.24
In contrast, community policing focuses on the notion of
partnerships between police and community. Under this theory, the
community should play a leading role in identifying policing priorities
and defining the problems that require police attention.25 As a National
Institute of Justice study explained, the four principles of community
policing are “community-based crime prevention, reorientation of
patrol, increased police accountability, and decentralization of
command.”26 The definition of community policing is murky and
susceptible to wildly different, even conflicting, interpretations.27
Accordingly, police departments may deem themselves to be practicing
community policing even when they adopt Broken Windows practices
23.

See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,”
67 Soc. Psychol. Q. 319, 336 (2004) (evaluating perceptions of disorder
and concluding that “social structure [i.e., race and class] proved a more
powerful predictor of perceived disorder than did carefully observed
disorder”).

24.

See, e.g., Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and
Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s
Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 Just. Q. 255, 273 (2010) (studying
impact of order maintenance tactics on young men in St. Louis and
concluding that “aggressive order maintenance manifesting in the form of
widespread stop-and-frisks can compromise procedural justice and,
therefore, undermine police legitimacy”); Bernard Harcourt & Jens
Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a FiveCity Social Experiment, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 271, 277 (2006) (reviewing
crime data in cities that utilized Broken Windows approach and finding
that order maintenance policing cannot be deemed “the optimal use of
scarce government resources”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the
Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the
Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (1998); Tom R. Tyler et al., The
Consequences of Being an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of
Proactive Police Contact, 12 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 602, 605 (2015)
(using national survey data to find that aggressive order maintenance
practices lowered police legitimacy among those who had the experience
of “being stopped and ‘feeling like a suspect’”).

25.

Livingston, supra note 14, at 576.

26.

Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. Rev.
834, 872 n.160 (2016) (quoting William Lyons, The Politics of
Community Policing: Rearranging the Power to Punish 35
(1999)).

27.

Id. at 872–73 (“[T]he theory and practices of community policing are
muddled . . . . Often [the underlying] concepts fill in the vagaries of or
complement one on [sic] another, but they also clash and confuse; where
one set of practices ends and the other begins is often unclear and subject
to debate.”); see also Livingston, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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that criminalize substantial portions of the community from which they
are supposed to take direction.28
Finally, problem-oriented policing embraces the notion “that the
‘police job requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioral
problems that arise in the community.’”29 Specifically, it “seeks to
identify the underlying causes of crime problems and to frame
appropriate responses tailored to problems based on the results of
analysis.”30 It is an approach that focuses on the underlying conditions
in areas where disorder and crime unfold rather than the possible
perpetrators. Along with community policing,31 reformers sometimes
call for the use of problem-oriented policing in response to concerns
about over-policing and criminalization.32
The following sections summarize the historical development of the
special attention police agencies have paid to public and patrolled
housing and the contemporaneous rise of hot spots policing. The aim is
to provide useful background on some of the common approaches to
policing public and patrolled housing, so that the limits of Fourth
Amendment protection in those locales can be more fully understood.

28.

See Akbar, supra note 26, at 873–75 (describing the push for community
policing “inflected by broken windows theory” and troubling results).

29.

Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, Policing Problem
Places: Crime Hot Spots and Effective Prevention 50 (2010).

30.

Braga, supra note 14, at 12.

31.

Community policing resembles problem-oriented policing and sometimes
incorporates problem-oriented policing processes. “The three core, and
densely interrelated, elements of community policing are citizen
involvement in identifying and addressing public safety concerns, the
decentralization of decision-making down the police organizational
hierarchy to encourage development of local responses to locally defined
problems, and problem solving to respond to community crime and
disorder concerns.” Id. at 11–12 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).

32.

See, e.g., Michael T. McPhearson, Denise Lieberman & John Chasnoff,
New Model of Policing Needed, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Apr. 8, 2015),
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/new-model-of-policingneeded/article_83e6937b-bd23-5918-ad8a-7852f4916349.html [https://
perma.cc/STH6-Y2DL] (steering committee members of Don’t Shoot
Coalition, composed of fifty St. Louis-area organizations formed after the
killing of Michael Brown, calling for community policing and critiquing
“[g]eographical hot-spot policing” that “disrupts whole neighborhoods”).
But see Brendan McQuade, Against Community Policing, Jacobin (Nov.
2015), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/11/obama-chicago-black-livesmatter-police-brutality/ [https://perma.cc/3WXV-GLZC] (arguing that
“while . . . community policing programs purport to build stronger
communities, they train small, self-selecting groups to amplify police
power,” and “there is no evidence that it will bring meaningful
accountability or otherwise curtail state violence”).
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A.

Targeting Public and Patrolled Housing

Public housing looms large in the public imagination as a major site
of urban disorder and criminality. Although crime problems are not, in
fact, universal, stereotypes about the dangers of public housing are
taken as an article of faith.33 There is reason to believe that this is true
even among criminologists and police officials.34 Likely as a result of
this widespread belief, police departments, and other law enforcement
agencies have trained their attention on public housing for at least forty
years, using a variety of approaches to address crime and disorder that
result in substantial police surveillance and control.35
In 1978, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) instituted federal efforts to address crime conditions in public
housing. It provided funding to thirty-nine local public housing
authorities with the aim of developing community-based anti-crime
programs.36 Using what would now be described as problem-oriented
33.

Garth Davies, Crime, Neighborhood, and Public Housing 9 (2006)
(“[W]hile there may, in fact, be some truth to the concept of ‘problem
projects,’ it is inaccurate and unfair to paint the entire public housing
universe with the same broad strokes.”); Fagan et al., Race and Selective
Enforcement in Public Housing, supra note 9, at 699 (explaining that links
between public housing and crime “are routinely revisited in the press,
which has provided near constant reminders of the drug problems in
public housing,” and are “reinforced by academic and media portrayals
and lead[] to a situation where outsiders . . . perceive public housing as
more dangerous than the facts can substantiate”); Harold R. Holzman,
Criminological Research on Public Housing: Toward a Better
Understanding of People, Places, and Spaces, 42 Crime & Delinq. 361,
361 (1996) (describing public housing’s “image problem”); Langley G.
Keyes, Strategies and Saints: Fighting Drugs in Subsidized
Housing 34–35 (1992); Fritz Umbach & Alexander Gerould, Myth #3:
Public Housing Breeds Crimes, in Public Housing Myths:
Perception, Reality, and Social Policy 66 (Nicholas Dagen Bloom
et al. eds., 2015) (“Portrayals of public housing complexes as ‘criminal
paradises’ stretch back to the late 1950s, when it became obvious that
reformers’ utopian visions of redeeming blighted urban tenements through
modern architecture and state management had failed to deliver.”).

34.

See Davies, supra note 33, at 7; Holzman, supra note 33, at 362–63
(describing the “information gap” in criminological research on public
housing because of small number of studies focused on public housing).

35.

See Fagan et al., Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, supra
note 9, at 697 (“The resulting labeling of public housing has led to a set
of law enforcement tactics that place residents under a very close police
gaze, justifies efforts to ‘contain’ residents within the boundaries of public
housing sites, and legitimizes the close surveillance of visitors and
neighbors from the surrounding communities who venture into public
housing’s perimeter.”).

36.

Sampson O. Annan & Wesley G. Skogan, The Police Foundation,
Drug Enforcement in Public Housing: Signs of Success in
Denver 9 (1993); I W. Victor Rouse & Herb Rubinstein, U.S. Dep’t
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policing strategies, the focus of these efforts was initially physical design
and environmental issues thought to contribute to crime, such as lack
of surveillance and lack of door and window locks.37 It did, however,
begin a coordinated effort to increase the use of specialized police in
public housing around the same time.38 The problem-oriented approach
was ultimately deemed a failed effort, and attention shifted to
enforcement-heavy approaches that were part of the larger War on
Drugs.39
In the 1990s, numerous local public housing authorities and cities
began to utilize more aggressive order maintenance strategies. In 1990,
the Police Executive Research Forum, the nation’s leading research
institute on policing practices, published a book on policing strategies
to address drug crimes in public housing.40 It described “occupying the
community,” accomplished by increasing police assigned to public
housing developments, opening “mini-police stations within the
complexes,” and “beefing up enforcement efforts,” as a common
approach.41 “Round-em up” tactics focused on public nuisances, and
undercover buy-and-bust operations also became popular.42 HUD’s
Drug Elimination Program (“DEP”), which provided financial support
to public housing authorities in their efforts to combat drug problems,

of Hous. And Urban Dev., Crime in Public Housing: A Review of
Major Issues and Selected Crime Reduction Strategies iv–v
(1978).
37.

See Rouse & Rubinstein, supra note 36, at 9–22. This focus on non-law
enforcement strategies may have developed because previous research did
not demonstrate that an increased police presence reduced crime. See
Oscar Newman & Susan A. Franck, Nat’l Inst. of Justice,
Factors Influencing Crime and Instability in Urban Housing
Developments 140 (1980).

38.

U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime
Program First Annual Report to Congress 16–17 (Mar. 31, 1980),
microformed on Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv. (Nat’l Inst. of
Justice) (describing federal efforts to provide funding for police in public
housing).

39.

Terence Dunworth & Aaron Saiger, Nat’l Inst. of Justice,
Drugs and Crime in Public Housing: A Three-City Analysis 6
(1994); Susan J. Popkin et al., The Hidden War: Crime and the
Tragedy of Public Housing in Chicago 29 (2000).

40.

Deborah Lamm Weisel, Police Exec. Research Forum, Tackling
Drug Problems in Public Housing: A Guide for Police (1990).

41.

Id. at 101–02 (describing efforts in this category in Philadelphia, Pa.; New
Orleans, La.; Baltimore, Md.; Orlando, Fla.; Tampa, Fla.; Atlanta, Ga;
Newport News, Va.; New Brunswick, N.J.; Alexandria, Va.; and Monette,
Ariz.).

42.

Popkin et al., supra note 39, at 29.
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helped fund some of these efforts.43 In stark contrast to prior HUD
programs, the overwhelming focus of DEP was an increased law
enforcement presence in public housing.44
Perhaps the most notorious example of 1990s-era aggressive
practices occurred in Chicago. There, the Chicago Housing Authority
and Chicago Police Department implemented Operation Clean Sweep,
which involved “surprise searches of apartments, typically conducted
before dawn, in which a team of law enforcement officers would
furtively enter a single high-rise without search warrants to locate
gangs, criminals, unreported household boarders, and illicit
paraphernalia.”45 After legal challenges brought by the ACLU, the
sweeps were severely limited and replaced with building-specific
patrols.46 Ultimately, after spending hundreds of millions of dollars, the
program was regarded as a failure.47 That said, it did inspire the
exploration and in some cases implementation of similar programs in
other major cities.48 It also spurred a national conversation about crime
control tactics in public housing. President Clinton ordered HUD and
the Justice Department to develop a plan to combat crime in public
housing.49 Six of the seven points involved expanded authority to search
43.

Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program, supra note
9, at 416–17.

44.

Theodore M. Hammett et al., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban
Dev., Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource
Document Final Report ii, 33 (1994) (reporting that 47 percent of
DEP funds were dedicated to law enforcement activities, compared to 6
percent each for physical improvements and drug treatment, and 4
percent for resident initiatives); id. at 38 (identifying “police patrol” as
among the top five most commonly cited activities funded through DEP).

45.

Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Rise and Fall of a Modern
Ghetto 130 (2000).

46.

Popkin et al., supra note 39, at 33.

47.

Id. at 175–76.

48.

David E.B. Smith, Note, Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt?: Constitutional
Issues in Chicago’s Public Housing Sweeps, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 505,
506–07 & nn.9–13 (1993) (noting that “sweep programs were considered
or instituted in Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Newark, Philadelphia,
Nashville, Detroit, Seattle, Des Moines, Annapolis, and Marquette,
Michigan”).

49.

William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address (Apr. 16, 1994),
(transcript available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/219057
[https://perma.cc/G37E-UAR5]); see also Ronald Brownstein, Frisk for
Guns at Housing Projects, Panel Urges, L.A. Times (Apr. 13, 1994),
http://articles.latimes.com/1994-04-13/news/mn-45548_1_housing-projects
[https://perma.cc/3ZCF-S4LN] (discussing the proposed plan); Lynn
Sweet, Clinton Unveils Tailored 7-Point Sweeps Policy, Chi. Sun Times,
Apr. 17, 1994, at 3 (describing the president’s new policy).
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apartments and people in public housing, such as an increased use of
stop-and-frisk and warrantless “consent searches” of apartments.50
Less high profile were the efforts like those of the Metropolitan
Police Department’s new Public Housing Division in Washington D.C.
There, the police department instituted several problem-oriented
strategies to address issues that it deemed to be particular to public
housing.51 For example, Operation Bark & Bite focused on public
housing residents’ ownership of dogs, particularly pit bulls, which
intimidated residents and were used in fights for gambling.52 In part
because public housing tenants’ leases barred dog ownership, the Public
Housing Division was able to issue citations to residents and impound
animals, as well as patrol buildings with housing authority staff
members who had access to apartments.53 Although this example does
not involve the typical crime conditions associated with public housing
in the popular imagination, it provides a good example of the expansive
tools and authority that police can put to use when they target public
housing.
And, although public housing usually receives outsized attention
regarding crime, private buildings also became a focus of policing
efforts. For example, in New York City, the Manhattan District
Attorney launched the Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”) in 1990.54
Later expanded to the entire city under the title “Operation Clean
Halls,” the NYPD receives permission from private landlords to patrol
the common areas of apartment buildings.55 The original focus of the
program was “narcotics sales taking place in the common areas of
private buildings, such as lobbies, stairwells, and rooftops.”56 It later
expanded to include other criminal activity and quality of life offenses
in the buildings.57 Such programs are effectively unregulated and no
comprehensive listing of them exists. Cases alleging improper arrests or

50.

Sweet, supra note 49.

51.

Joshua Ederheimer, Complex Crime: Contending with Crime in Public
Housing, in 3 Problem Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific
Problems, Critical Issues, and Making POP Work, at x (Corina
Sole & Eugenia E. Gratto eds., 2000).

52.

Id. at 9.

53.

Id. at 10–11.

54.

Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85, 517 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 517.

57.

Id. at 517–19.
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other encounters between residents or their guests suggest that this
practice extends beyond New York City.58
Aside from these policing strategies heralded by police departments,
HUD, and local governments, police programs and practices targeted
at public and patrolled housing have also come to light through
investigations and lawsuits challenging them. For example, the U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division found in recent
investigations that the Baltimore and Newark police departments
singled out public housing residents for arrest and citation. The
Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) concentrated on public housing
for trespassing enforcement, resulting in unconstitutional arrests.59 At
least one BPD district even used a template for processing trespassing
arrests in public housing,60 presumably to make them easier.
Astonishingly, the template’s section for an arrestee’s demographic
information was pre-filled with the words “black male,” thus
“presum[ing] that individuals arrested for trespassing will be African
American.”61 In Newark, the Justice Department identified complaints
that the police department focused on public housing projects as
“convenient targets” for citations for quality of life infractions.62
Numerous courts have also weighed in on these targeted practices
as a result of constitutional challenges brought by residents and their
guests. Public housing residents in Frederick, Maryland brought a
lawsuit charging that the local police department, which had entered
an agreement with the public housing authority, was illegally arresting
people for trespassing.63 After advising residents to “carry their photo
identification with them at all times to display to police,” the housing
authority maintained a “trespass log” to document those who had been
issued trespassing citations, i.e., “[p]ersons believed to be at one of the
Apartments with ‘no apparent legitimate reason.’”64 If persons listed on
the log were encountered again on the grounds of the public housing
58.

See, e.g., Franklin v. Montgomery Cty., Md., No. DKC 2005–0489, 2006
WL 2632298, at *7–8 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2006) (describing police
department’s authority to patrol private housing complex); L.D.L. v.
State, 569 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Holland
v. Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d 145, 145–46 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (same).

59.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the
Baltimore City Police Dep’t 37–38 (2016).

60.

Id.

61.

Id. at 37.

62.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the
Newark Police Department 21 (2014).

63.

Diggs v. Hous. Auth. of Frederick, 67 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524–25 (D. Md.
1999).

64.

Id. at 525–26.
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apartments, they were arrested solely because their name appeared on
the trespass log.65 Residents and visitors have challenged similar
trespass enforcement practices used in public and patrolled housing
complexes in Ohio, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, and
Washington.66 In East Chicago, Indiana, a public housing resident sued
because, pursuant to a relationship between the public housing
authority and police department, the police routinely entered
apartments with drug-sniffing dogs to conduct searches.67
Pending cases in Buffalo and Oakland raise constitutional questions
about policing practices in public housing as well. A public housing
resident in Oakland, along with his frequent guest, have challenged the
Oakland Housing Authority Police Department’s (“OHAPD”) practice
of stopping, questioning, and searching public housing residents and
their guests without suspicion under the guise of enforcing an
unconstitutionally vague loitering ordinance.68 The lead plaintiff was
named in at least sixty-three incident reports reflecting stops or
interactions with OHAPD officers between 2011 and 2017.69 OHAPD
incident reports indicate that officers routinely conduct warrant and
records checks of people they accuse of loitering, and officers often
handcuff them as well.70 Officers also frequently request that the
housing authority’s legal counsel review residents’ leases for possible

65.

Id. at 526.

66.

See Brown v. Dayton Metro. Hous. Auth., No. C-3-93-037, 1993 WL
1367433 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 1993); State ex rel. X.B., 952 A.2d 521 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Holland v. Commonwealth, 502 S.E.2d 145,
145–46 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (describing the Leesburg, Virginia police
department’s agreement with a federally-subsidized apartment complex
so that it would have power to “issue barment notices to unauthorized
individuals present on the . . . property”); City of Bremerton v. Widell,
51 P.3d 733 (Wash. 2002) (en banc) (describing fiancés of two public
housing tenants in Bremerton, Washington suit against the police
department because they were ticketed or arrested for trespassing multiple
times as a result of the public housing authority’s trespassing policy,
which gave the police department authority to issue barment notices to
nonresidents); Kimberly E. O’Leary, Dialogue, Perspective and Point of
View as Lawyering Method: A New Approach to Evaluating Anti-Crime
Measures in Subsidized Housing, 49 Wash. U.J. Urb. & Contemp. L.
133, 134 n.4 (1996) (describing aggressive arrest practices in public
housing in Plymouth, Massachusetts, and St. Michaels, Maryland).

67.

Gutierrez v. City of East Chicago, No. 2:16-CV-111-JVB-PRC, 2016 WL
5819818 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 6, 2016).

68.

Complaint at 10–12, Mathieu v. City of Oakland, No. 18-cv-5742 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 19, 2018).

69.

Id. at 13.

70.

See id. at Exhibits. B, F, H, N, T, X.
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eviction.71 Groups of all sizes have drawn OHAPD attention, including
a gathering following a funeral.72
In Buffalo, a local Black Lives Matter group filed a complaint with
the New York Attorney General that accused the Buffalo Police
Department’s housing unit of engaging in unconstitutional trespass
enforcement policies, including trespass “sweeps” and checkpoints that
resulted in unconstitutional arrests in and around public housing
complexes.73 A federal lawsuit filed in 2018 further alleges that the
housing unit has played an outsized role in the Buffalo Police
Department’s policy and practice of utilizing unconstitutional
checkpoints for crime control purposes.74 That unit writes
approximately one third of the traffic tickets issued by the entire police
department.75
In sum, public and patrolled housing have received special attention
from police departments for decades. For public housing in particular,
federal funding has driven some of this attention, which has taken
varying forms, but appears to have focused in more recent years on
aggressive order maintenance strategies. These targeted programs have
persisted even as traditional public housing has been on the decline in
recent years.
B.

Hot Spots Policing

The rise of policing targeted at public and patrolled housing in
recent decades has coincided with a newfound emphasis on hot spots
policing. Indeed, hot spots policing has become wildly popular across
the United States76 and is often called for as an element of “smart
71.

See id. at Exhibits. H & X.

72.

Id. at Exhibit. J.

73.

Anjana
Malhotra,
Unchecked
Authority
without
Accountability in Buffalo, New York: The Buffalo Police
Department’s
Widespread
Pattern
and
Practice
of
Unconstitutional Discriminatory Policing, and the Human,
Social and Economic Costs 15–16 (2017).

74.

Complaint at 10–15, Black Love Resists in the Rust v. City of Buffalo,
No. 18-cv-00719-CCR (W.D.N.Y. June 28, 2018) (describing checkpoint
practices).

75.

Id. at 17.

76.

See Anthony A. Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime;
An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 Just. Q. 633, 634,
636-37 (2014) [hereinafter Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing
on Crime] (noting that a majority of American police departments use
hot spots policing strategies and that of 192 police agencies surveyed in
2008 by the Police Executive Research Forum, nine out of ten used hot
spots strategies). As local news reports demonstrate, police departments
both large and small have embraced its use. See Kochel, supra note 8, at
359–62 (finding “almost exclusively positive press” about hot spots

686

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
When Stop and Frisk Comes Home

policing.”77 Law enforcement’s eager adoption of hot spots policing has
likely contributed to the targeting of public and patrolled housing for
police programs. While police departments do not always utilize the
term “hot spots policing” when identifying the place-based strategies
they employ, it is fair to describe their enforcement strategies that zero
in on particular locations as versions of hot spots policing.78 It is
therefore useful to understand the concepts underlying hot spots
policing in an examination of policing programs targeted at public and
patrolled housing.
Police agencies and criminologists have embraced the concept that
problem places require special police attention for decades,79 but in the
last thirty years, hot spots policing strategies have emerged as a favorite

policing in review of Midwest media coverage between 1990 and 2005);
see also, e.g., Phil Fairbanks, Erie County Gets $1.7 Million Grant to
Fight Gun Violence, Buffalo News (July 7, 2016), https://buffalonews.
com/2016/07/07/erie-county-gets-1-7-million-grant-to-fight-gun-violence/
[https://perma.cc/9YNQ-EKEZ] (describing hot spots policing to be one
of two strategies funded by large grant); Tristan Hallman, More Dallas
Police Officers Put on 911 Response Patrols, Dall. Morning News
(Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/crime/2015/10/05/
more-dallas-police-officers-put-on-911-response-patrols [https://perma.cc/
5SQD-KJND] (noting that hot spot policing was a “major initiative” of
Dallas police chief); Kim Bell, St. Louis Takes Another Shot at Hot-Spot
Policing, St. Louis Post Dispatch (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-takes-another-shot-at-hotspot-policing/article_b71de858-3780-5498-99ba-5939e85777c4.html [https://
perma.cc/632Z-4JZ2] (describing “new rounds” of hot-spot policing,
described by the St. Louis police chief as one of his department’s “core
principles”); Maxine Bernstein, Portland City Council Accepts Federal
Grant to Help Police Study 15-Minute Hot Spot Policing, Oregonian
(Nov. 5, 2014), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/2014/11/portland_
city_council_accepts.html [https://perma.cc/W8BC-GB25] (describing a
federal grant to Portland police department to study new hot spots
policing program).
77.

James R. Coldren, Jr. et al., Introducing Smart Policing: Foundations,
Principles, and Practice, 16 Police Q. 275 (2013) (describing the
development of smart policing).

78.

The NYPD is a good example of a police department that has used hot
spots strategies without labeling them as such. See generally David
Weisburd et al., Could Innovations in Policing Have Contributed to the
New York City Crime Drop Even in a Period of Declining Police
Strength?: The Case of Stop, Question and Frisk as a Hot Spots Policing
Strategy, 31 Just. Q. 129 (2014) (concluding that the NYPD’s Operation
Impact, which involved the focused use of stop and frisk in “Impact
Zones,” was a hot spots strategy).

79.

Fagan et al., supra note 19, at 472–73 (describing criminological emphasis
on place dating to the 1920s).
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tool to combat crime and disorder.80 The basic concept underlying hot
spots policing is “the application of police interventions at very small
geographic units of analysis,”81 such as “buildings or addresses, block
faces or street segments, or clusters of addresses, block faces and street
segments.”82
But hot spots policing is not one-size-fits-all. Instead, police
departments may use any policing strategy—order maintenance,
community policing, or problem-oriented policing—to implement hot
spots policing. David Weisburd, a criminologist who pioneered the
concept of hot spots policing, describes the variety of approaches as
follows:
There is no single way to implement hot spots policing.
Approaches can range rather dramatically across interventions.
For example, strategies of hot spots policing are often based
simply on drastically increasing officer time spent at hot spots, as
was the case in the Minneapolis, Minnesota, Hot Spots Patrol
Experiment. But hot spots policing can also employ much more
complex interventions to do something about crime problems. In
the Jersey City, New Jersey, Drug Market Analysis Program
Experiment, for example, a three-step program (including
identifying and analyzing problems, developing tailored
responses, and maintaining crime control gains) was used to
reduce problems at drug hot spots. Also in Jersey City, in the
Jersey City POP Experiment, a problem-oriented policing
approach was taken in developing a specific strategy for each of
the violent crime hot spots.83

Thus, some police agencies have consciously employed an order
maintenance approach and increased enforcement actions, e.g., stops,
arrests, and tickets, as part of their hot spots strategies, while others
have focused on community policing and problem-oriented policing
strategies.84

80.

Braga, supra note 14, at 13 (“[C]rime is not evenly distributed across
urban areas; rather, it is concentrated in very small places, or hot spots,
that generate half of all criminal events.”).

81.

Braga & Weisburd, supra note 29, at 9.

82.

Braga, supra note 14, at 13.

83.

David Weisburd, Does Hot Spots Policing Inevitably Lead to Unfair and
Abusive Police Practices, or Can We Maximize Both Fairness and
Effectiveness in the New Proactive Policing?, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 661,
667 (2016) (footnotes omitted).

84.

See Braga et al., The Effects of Hot Spots Policing on Crime, supra note
76, at 642–43, 644–51 tbl.2 (describing interventions used in nineteen hot
spots policing programs).
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For example, the Houston Police Department utilized a
combination of approaches in its “Targeted Beat Program.”85 All of the
department’s participating substations initially used order maintenance
strategies and some altered their strategies over time.86 In one where
public housing was concentrated officers began by saturating particular
beats with officers, and ultimately settled on “targeting apartment
complexes and the disproportionate amount of calls being generated by
a small number of complexes.”87 Officers spent the majority of their
time “in high crime areas or doing apartment checks.”88 In one beat
where public housing comprised 25 percent of the apartment units, the
police department implemented a program to “take back the beat,”
which involved “[c]rime sweeps through government housing and
problem apartment complexes.”89 Consequently, officers in that beat
spent close to 80 percent of their time patrolling public housing and
private apartment buildings.90 In other beats, the use of stops,
categorized separately from sweeps, was more prevalent.91 In one, over
70 percent of stops led to arrests or the issuance of summonses,
including for “walking on the wrong side of the street” or similarly
minor offenses.92 Other departments have also utilized order
maintenance strategies in their pursuit of driving down crime in hot
spots.93

85.

Tory J. Caeti, Houston’s Targeted Beat Program: A Quasi-Experimental
Test of Police Patrol Strategies (May 1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Sam Houston State University) (on file with author).

86.

Id. at 188.

87.

Id. at 115, 189.

88.

Id. at 213. The study did not define “apartment checks.”

89.

Id. at 116, 190–91. The published study of the Houston Police
Department’s program did not provide details describing the tactics used
during the sweeps.

90.

Id. at 211.

91.

It is hard to imagine that the sweeps of apartment buildings did not
involve frequent stops of people encountered in and around them, but the
study categorized stops as a different tactic. See id. at 210–18.

92.

Id. at 218.

93.

See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga et al., Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent
Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment, 37 Criminology
541, 554–55 (1999) (describing Jersey City hot spots experiments in which
“aggressive order maintenance” tactics, including “dispersing groups of
loiterers, issuing a summons for public drinking, and ‘stop and frisks’ of
suspicious persons”); Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects
of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12
Just. Q. 673, 677 (1995) (describing that hot spots strategies included
conducting “field interrogations in gun crime hot spots”).
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In contrast, hot spots policing can also utilize a problem-oriented
policing model. Examples in Jacksonville and Boston demonstrate that
police departments can make environmental changes to reduce the
prevalence of crime in hot spots. Rather than focusing on code
enforcement, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Department made lighting
improvements and fencing repairs, and consulted with business owners
and rental property managers about security measures.94 The Boston
Police Department made similar environmental changes in a hot spot
and also worked with a local high school whose students were targeted
for robberies to bring attention to the crime problem.95
Leading criminologists who study hot spots policing tend to be
strong advocates for the problem-oriented policing approach.96 Yet, the
order maintenance methodology appears to be ubiquitous among the
police departments that utilize hot spots strategies.97 And, as the
Houston example demonstrates, hot spots practices are sometimes
directed towards public and patrolled housing as part of larger
programs.

94.

Bruce Taylor et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Different Policing
Strategies at Hot Spots of Violent Crime, 7 J. Experimental
Criminology 149, 158 (2011).

95.

Anthony A. Braga & Cory Schnell, Evaluating Place-Based Policing
Strategies: Lessons Learned from the Smart Policing Initiative in Boston,
16 Police Q. 339, 348–50 (2013).

96.

For example, in their recent book on hot spots policing, Anthony Braga
and David Weisburd made clear that they think problem-oriented policing
is a better approach for hot spots policing, particularly in light of the costs
that zero tolerance strategies can impose:
We believe that how police address crime hot spots matters. Police
officers should strive to use problem-oriented policing and
situational crime prevention techniques to address the place
dynamics, situations, and characteristics that cause a “spot” to be
“hot.” We also make the point that the strategies used to police
problem places can have more or less desirable effects on policecommunity relations. Particularly in minority neighborhoods
where residents have long suffered from elevated crime problems
and historically poor police service, police officers should make an
effort to develop positive and collaborative relationships with
residents and not engage in strategies that will undermine the
legitimacy of police agencies, such as indiscriminant enforcement
tactics.
Braga & Weisburd, supra note 29, at 4–5.

97.

Kochel, supra note 8, at 365 (finding that review of criminological
scholarship on hot spots and review of Midwest media on hot spots
programs found “little or no mention” of problem-oriented strategies, but
instead “most hot spots approaches appeared to be enforcement-oriented,
including directed patrol, saturation of an area with police presence, or
zero tolerance of order maintenance violations”).
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In sum, public and patrolled housing are often subject to significant
scrutiny from law enforcement agencies, both because police
departments develop programs that explicitly target them and because
they sometimes deploy hot spots strategies in those locales. Some of the
attention public and patrolled housing receive from police is rooted in
genuine concern about crime conditions, but in some cases it results
from presumptions and prejudice against those places and the people
who live in and frequent them. Consequently, the residents and visitors
of public and patrolled housing are often subject to outsized police
attention. Moreover, police departments have consciously decided to
use their unique access to public and patrolled housing to execute
targeted and hot spots strategies.
In light of limited Fourth Amendment protections, which are
described in detail in Part II, programs that target public and patrolled
housing can result in police surveillance and control of law-abiding
people who live in or frequent public and patrolled housing. Under the
auspices of programs that are ostensibly designed to protect and serve
the residents of public and patrolled housing, the Fourth Amendment
operates to permit widespread stops, arrests, and searches of people
who engage in behavior, often innocuous, that is either not criminalized
in other places or simply never subject to police oversight.

II. The Fourth Amendment in Public and Patrolled
Housing
The Fourth Amendment’s usual protection for the home is
unrecognizable in public and patrolled housing. Although scholars have
long acknowledged that the Fourth Amendment offers limited
protection for those who live in urban areas where their daily lives are
more exposed to public view than their wealthy counterparts’, the
Fourth Amendment rights of residents of public and patrolled housing
are uniquely circumscribed. What powers do police have when they
execute targeted and hot spots strategies in public and patrolled
housing? Just about any they can dream up outside the doors of
individual apartments.
As noted above, the home has such an exalted status that one
scholar has described a “cult of the home” in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.98 This cult, however, is much more welcoming to private
homes than to apartments. With regard to searches, government agents
are typically required to procure warrants before searching private
homes,99 including the curtilage—the “area around the home to which
98.

See Stern, supra note 1, at 912–18 (describing Fourth Amendment
protection for the home).

99.

See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 752–54 (1984). A major exception
to this rule is the authority to search welfare recipients’ homes. See Jordan
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the activity of home life extends.”100 An enclosed backyard of a house
is the paradigmatic example of curtilage.101 In the same vein, police may
not enter homes to make arrests absent exigent circumstances.102 There
are many fewer restrictions on searches and seizures in “public” places,
where arrests may generally take place without warrants,103 and
searches may be permissible if there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy.104 In the context of apartment buildings and other multi-unit
dwellings, the warrant requirement extends to the interiors of
apartments, but typically not to the common areas of such buildings.
C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 Ind. L.J. 355, 359–73
(2010) (describing supposed “special status of the home” in the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and the “competing narrative” of treatment of
homes of the poor); Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty,
99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 643, 697–708 (2009) (describing decadeslong judicial approval of home searches of public assistance recipients).
100. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984). The Court has
developed a four-factor test for identifying curtilage: (1) “the proximity
of the area . . . to the home”; (2) “whether the area is included [in] an
enclosure surrounding the home”; (3) “the nature of the uses to which the
area is put”; and (4) “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area
from observation by people passing by.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S.
294, 301 (1987). Because curtilage “has been considered part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,” the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement applies to searches of curtilage in the same way it
applies to the home. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
101. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211–13 (1986) (noting that
enclosed backyard “immediately adjacent to a suburban home,
surrounded by high double fences,” with “close nexus to the home” was
part of home’s curtilage). Determining whether a particular area
constitutes curtilage is a fact-intensive inquiry, which has led to disparate
results. See LaFave, supra note 2, § 2.3(d) (collecting examples of
structures and areas found to be curtilage (or not)).
102. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213–14 (1981) (holding that,
absent exigent circumstances or consent, a search warrant is required to
search a third party’s home for the subject of an arrest warrant); Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to
seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment
has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent
circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
warrant.”).
103. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976) (upholding the
warrantless arrest of a defendant who stood at the threshold of her house
because she was in a “‘public’ place”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 423–24 (1976) (upholding a warrantless arrest in a public place).
104. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
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Those spaces are deemed public, and courts largely have held that
apartment dwellers cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in
them.105 This comparatively restrictive definition of the home applies to
rich and poor alike; the hallways of buildings where apartments cost
millions are likely not curtilage, just as they are not in public housing.
But other unique characteristics of the way Fourth Amendment law
operates in public and patrolled housing leads to the differential
treatment of its residents. Thus, despite the special status of the home,
the Fourth Amendment does not provide the freedom of movement,
privacy, autonomy, or dignity to residents of public and patrolled
housing that most Americans expect.
The primary source of the extraordinary police power in and around
public and patrolled housing is the astounding breadth of state and
local laws and rules that regulate and often criminalize conduct in those
locations. Devon Carbado has described this phenomenon more
generally as “mass criminalization”: “the criminalization of relatively
nonserious behavior or activities and the multiple ways in which
criminal justice actors, norms, and strategies shape welfare state
processes and policies.”106
There are several methods by which mass criminalization in public
and patrolled housing is achieved. Some states and localities enact
restrictions by statute or ordinance that are specific to public housing.
The paradigmatic examples are statutes that specifically bar drug
possession or sale in public housing.107 In addition, some local housing
authorities and private landlords require compliance with specific terms
of conduct in leases signed by tenants or in house rules incorporated
into leases by reference, which law enforcement officers are empowered
to enforce.108 Further, quality of life laws of general application

105. See Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and Curtilage: What Jardines Teaches
and What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 Hous. L. Rev. 1289, 1303–05 (2015)
(reviewing post-2000 cases on whether common areas of multi-unit
apartment buildings constitute curtilage and concluding that “the
overwhelming weight of authority rejects the proposition that a resident
of a multi-dwelling residential building can claim curtilage protection in
common areas—or even anywhere outside an individual unit”).
106. Carbado, supra note 12, at 1487.
107. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a-278a(b) (West 2019); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 893.13(1)(f) (West 2018); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:35-7.1(a)
(West 2019).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 399 F.3d 750, 751–52 (6th Cir. 2005)
(describing an agreement between the public housing authority of Inskter,
Michigan and the local police department); City of Bremerton v. Widell,
51 P.3d 733, 735 n.1 (Wash. 2002) (describing Bremerton Housing
Authority’s exclusion policy); L.D.L. v. State, 569 So. 2d 1310, 1311 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing policy of a “low-rent federally subsidized
housing project” that provided authority to Tallahassee Police
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addressing a wide range of subjects—noise ordinances, jaywalking,
smoking, open container, riding bicycles on sidewalks—are all
enforceable in and around public and patrolled housing. The U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division’s description of the
Ferguson, Missouri municipal code aptly captures the incredible
breadth of conduct that is often regulated by local authorities—ranging
from “Manner of Walking in Roadway” to the height of grass and
weeds.109 As a result, police officers have a plethora of tools at their
disposal when they determine that they want to conduct a stop, arrest,
or “voluntary” encounter on the grounds of public or patrolled housing.
Two examples from New York illustrate how both laws specific to
housing and laws of general application create mass criminalization in
public and patrolled housing. The New York Penal Law specifically
criminalizes trespassing in public housing developments.110 When a
person enters or remains on the premises of a public housing
development despite a “housing officer or other person in charge”
having “personally communicated” a request to leave, they have
committed criminal trespass.111 A person also commits criminal trespass
when they enter or remain on the premises of a public housing
development in violation of “conspicuously posted rules or regulations
governing entry and use thereof.”112 Thus, law enforcement officers have
unique powers in public housing to expel people at will, followed by the
pain of arrest for failure to comply. Remarkably, even public housing
residents become criminals when they are present in spaces of their own
buildings that are deemed off limits.113 Laws of general application that
are only enforced in certain locations also play a role. For example,
Department to “issue no trespass warnings and/or to arrest any persons
loitering on the property who are not residents”).
109. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the
Ferguson Police Department 7 (2015) (“[T]he code establishes
housing violations, such as High Grass and Weeds; requirements for
permits to rent an apartment or use the City’s trash service; animal
control ordinances, such as Barking Dog and Dog Running at Large; and
a number of other violations, such as Manner of Walking in Roadway.”)
(citing Ferguson, Mo. Code of Ordinances §§ 29-16, 37-1, 46-27, 65, 6-11, 44-344 (2018)); see also Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal
Law of Municipal Governance, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1409 (2001) (describing
the authority of municipal governments to enact criminal laws and the
breadth of such laws).
110. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e), (f) (McKinney 2019).
111. § 140.10(f).
112. § 140.10(e).
113. See infra notes 249–251 and accompanying text (recounting the arrest of
a public housing resident and his guest because of their presence on his
building’s roof landing).
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smoking is banned in the common areas of apartment buildings in New
York City with three or more units and failure to comply with this law
can result in citation.114 But this offense is likely to result in a police
encounter only in buildings where police officers have a regular
presence. Thus, mass criminalization operates uniquely in public and
patrolled housing to expose residents and others in and around those
locations to the criminal justice system.
In combination with the intensity of police attention to public and
patrolled housing through targeted and hot spots strategies, mass
criminalization results in the Fourth Amendment offering
extraordinarily limited protection to those who live in and frequent
public and patrolled housing. Three doctrines are particularly
important in understanding this dynamic. First, police officers have
virtually limitless authority to stop people in and around public and
patrolled housing because of the breadth of conduct regulated in those
places, the very low standard for conducting stops on suspicion of
noncriminal infractions, and the frequent labeling of public and
patrolled housing as high-crime areas. Second, the Supreme Court
created extraordinarily broad arrest authority when it determined that
the Fourth Amendment did not bar arrests for very minor crimes—
even ones for which arrest is not permitted under state law. This makes
violators of the uniquely broad sets of regulations in public and
patrolled housing subject to arrest for astonishingly minor misbehavior.
Third, the search incident to arrest doctrine leaves those who frequent
locations targeted by place-based policing programs especially
vulnerable to invasive searches. Numerous courts have interpreted this
exception to permit searches whenever there is probable cause to
arrest—even when an arrest has not taken place.
Taken together, these doctrines leave residents of public and
patrolled housing uniquely vulnerable to police surveillance and control.
They may be stopped, arrested, and searched for almost anything. As
a result, when police utilize targeted and hot spots policing strategies,
particularly the order maintenance variety, only the interiors of their
apartments provide sanctuary. In short, the substantial privacy and
dignitary interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are effectively
dead letters in public and patrolled housing.
A.

Stop for Anything

The power to stop people on the basis of a relatively low level of
suspicion for even minor infractions is the cornerstone of the targeted
policing practices utilized in public and patrolled housing. As explained
in Part I, all manner of law enforcement personnel patrol public and
patrolled housing, e.g., special departments, units, and regular patrols,
including those tasked with enforcing hot spots strategies. When they
114. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 17-503(a)(13), 17-508(d), 17-508(e) (2018).
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do, there is little they must see to justify approaching a person,
questioning them about their conduct, and temporarily detaining
them.115 The standard for stops announced by the Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio116 is by now familiar: reasonable suspicion, based on
articulable facts, that an individual is involved in criminal activity.117
Numerous problems with this standard are widely recognized, ranging
from the derogation of the probable cause standard118 to its failure to
acknowledge the role of race in identifying suspicious behavior.119 But
when police focus their attention on public and patrolled housing, Terry
operates to expose residents to almost unbridled power to detain and
question residents, their guests, and others who are legitimately present.
Two doctrinal areas are particularly important for understanding how
and why police officers have such extraordinary power: the permission
to stop for noncriminal infractions and the notion that presence in a
high-crime area contribute to reasonable suspicion.
1.

Stops for Infractions, Regulations, and House Rules

When enforcing the wide variety of laws, rules, and regulations that
govern conduct in and around public and patrolled housing, the Fourth
Amendment requires a very low level of suspicion to initiate a stop. As
with stops made on suspicion of criminal activity, courts typically
require only reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain people on
suspicion of noncriminal infractions.120 Although some states have
115. Of course, “voluntary” and “consensual” encounters in which a reasonable
person would feel free to leave are not stops and therefore not subject to
Fourth Amendment regulation at all. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (“[T]he police can be said to have seized an individual
‘only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’”
(citation omitted)).
116. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
117. Id. at 30.
118. See Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 50–
56 (2016).
119. See, e.g., Capers, supra note 6; Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 6; Maclin, supra note 6; Thompson, supra note 6.
120. See, e.g., In re A.J., 63 A.3d 562 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding a stop for
truancy); State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388 (Iowa 1986) (same for public
intoxication); State v. Dumas, 786 So. 2d 80 (La. 2001) (same for a city
ordinance prohibiting walking in a roadway); People v. McNutt, No.
313621, 2014 WL 1510118, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014) (same for a
suspected noise ordinance violation); City of Devil’s Lake v. Lawrence,
639 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 2002) (same for disorderly conduct); State v.
Morris, 641 P.2d 77 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (same for curfew law); State v.
Iverson, 871 N.W.2d 661 (Wis. 2015) (same for littering). Similarly, it has
long been clear that law enforcement officers need only have reasonable
suspicion to make noncriminal traffic stops. See Jordan Blair Woods,
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specifically cabined stop authority so that officers may conduct stops
only when they suspect misdemeanors or felonies, this appears to be a
minority position.121 Accordingly, an encounter with a police officer that
the subject cannot end may lead to an arrest, a search, or other
significant disruption.
Law enforcement officers’ use of the broad range of regulated
conduct in public and patrolled housing is analogous to the utilization
of America’s many traffic laws to initiate car stops on roads and
highways. As David Harris has observed in that context, “the
comprehensive scope of state traffic codes makes them extremely
powerful tools . . . . These codes regulate the details of driving in ways
both big and small, obvious and arcane . . . . [N]o driver can avoid
violating some traffic law during a short drive, even with the most
careful attention.”122 The same is true in public and patrolled housing,
where the banalities of daily life—ball playing, the placement of BBQ
grills, the size of pets, and rollerblading—are subject to rules and
regulations and provide opportunities for stops.123
In light of this wide breadth of regulated conduct and the low
quantum of suspicion required to initiate them, the risk that police will
Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA
L. Rev. 672, 711–13, 713 & n.181 (2015) (collecting cases and concluding
that “most courts now use a reasonable suspicion standard to evaluate
the state and federal constitutionality of police initiations of routine traffic
stops,” although the Supreme Court has not expressly decided the
appropriate standard for traffic stops).
121. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2016) (allowing
stops for only felonies or misdemeanors identified in the New York Penal
Law); Brazwell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 499 (Ark. 2003) (holding that a stop
made on suspicion of loitering unlawful); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945
N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 2011) (holding that a suspected violation of a nontraffic
civil infraction does not justify an investigatory stop); State v. Duncan,
43 P.3d 513, 517 (Wash. 2015) (same).
122. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 544, 545 (1997).
123. The wide array of regulations governing conduct is arguably even broader
than written because mistakes of law by police officers will typically be
forgiven. See Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (holding that
stop was supported by reasonable suspicion even though the officer made
a “reasonable” mistake of law underlying suspicion); Kit Kinports, Heien’s
Mistake of Law, 68 Ala. L. Rev. 121, 168–74 (2016) (describing risk that
Heien would be read to permit police officers to make mistakes of law,
resulting in the upholding of searches and seizures in a variety of
circumstances); cf. United States v. Davis, 692 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Va.
2010) (pre-Heien, suppressing evidence revealed following a stop for
walking in the roadway between two housing projects “known to be high
crime areas” because officer was mistaken that law barred walking in
roadways without sidewalks).
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use minor misbehavior as pretext to stop is uniquely high in public and
patrolled housing. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v.
United States,124 pretextual stops pose no Fourth Amendment problem.
There, the Court sanctioned the car stop of two African American men
in a “high drug area” for turning and failing to signal.125 The fact that
the officers were in plainclothes and members of the Washington D.C.
police department’s vice squad provided strong evidence that cracking
down on traffic infractions was not the officers’ actual interest.126 The
stopped men argued that the stop had been based on race and therefore
violated the Fourth Amendment.127 The Court rejected this claim,
holding that intentional race discrimination is irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment inquiries and that as long as an officer can identify any
legal violation as the basis for a stop, the Fourth Amendment’s
demands have been met.128 Despite the legion of criticism that followed
this decision,129 Whren stands, thus cementing the ability of police
officers to conduct stops on virtually any basis—even if the underlying
motivation is rooted in animus, stereotypes, or unproven ordermaintenance policing strategies.
2.

High-Crime Areas

The second area of law that fuels stops in public and patrolled
housing is the standardless high-crime area doctrine. In Brown v.
Texas,130 the Supreme Court appeared to establish that one’s mere
presence in a high-crime area could not be sufficient to articulate
reasonable suspicion.131 There, police stopped, frisked, and arrested a
man encountered in an alley in a “high drug problem area.”132 The
initial encounter rested on only the supposition that the man’s presence

124. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
125. Id. at 808.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 810–14.
128. Id. at 813.
129. See, e.g., Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, supra note 6
(arguing that Whren permits race to be part of officer’s rationale as long
as he does not say so); Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable
but Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of
Whren v. United States, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 882, 884 & n.2 (2015)
(collecting literature linking Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to racial
profiling).
130. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
131. Id. at 52.
132. Id. at 49.
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in an alley “‘looked suspicious.’”133 The Court unanimously rejected the
proposition that such mere presence constituted reasonable suspicion,
emphasizing the need for individualized suspicion that the targeted
individual has engaged in criminal activity.134 Standing alone, this
decision suggests that people who live in or frequent areas with
reputations as problem places would be free from police interactions
merely because of their presence in them. But later decisions rendered
this decision, which de-linked problem places and the people who
happen to be in them, a fallacy.
The Court fatally undermined Brown in Illinois v. Wardlow.135
There, the Court held that the “relevant characteristics of a location”
may be used to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.136 Thus,
one’s presence in a high-crime area is “among the relevant contextual
considerations in a Terry analysis.”137 The stop at issue in Wardlow
itself rested on two simple facts: the defendant’s presence in “an area
known for heavy narcotics trafficking, [where] officers anticipated
encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug
customers and individuals serving as lookouts,”138 and the defendant’s
“unprovoked flight upon noticing the police.”139 For the Supreme Court,
these meager “facts” were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.140
Scholars have rightly critiqued Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
about high-crime areas as effectively meaningless.141 There is no
common definition of high-crime area, and courts use a variety of
metrics to define them. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson and Damien
Bernache aptly summarized the confusion as follows:

133. Id. at 52.
134. Id. (“The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself
was engaged in criminal conduct . . . . [T]he appellant’s activity was no
different from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood.”).
135. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
136. Id. at 124.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 24–25.
141. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “HighCrime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence
for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 Am. U. L.
Rev. 1587 (2008); Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the
Street: Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating
Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J. 99 (1999).
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[S]ome courts have defined a high-crime area as an area of
“expected criminal activity,” which fits within the language of
Wardlow. Other courts have described it as an area known for
drug activity, or one under surveillance. Still other courts have
held that a high-crime area is one that is “riddled with narcotics
dealings and drug-related shootings.” Some courts have found
that a “crime wave” can create a high-crime area. Being an area
which is “notorious” or has a reputation for illegal conduct can
also qualify an area as high-crime. Areas “plagued by gang-related
shootings, drug dealing, assaults, and robberies” may also be
termed high-crime areas. . . . . How does one know one is in a
high-crime area? How is the determination that a location is a
high-crime area made? These questions are still unanswered.142

The NYPD provides a good example of the meaninglessness of this
term. It trains its officers that high-crime area could refer to a building,
a block, a sector within a precinct, or an entire county.143
This definitional morass, in combination with a heavy reliance on
officer testimony to identify high-crime areas,144 means, in practical
terms, that whenever a police department identifies a hot spot or other
problem location and subjects it to specialized policing strategies, a
court will accept that it is a high-crime area. Unsurprisingly, the case
law is littered with examples of courts identifying public and other
patrolled housing as high-crime areas.145 This designation may be
142. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141, at 1605–06 (footnotes omitted).
143. See Transcript of Motion Hearing at 862–64, Ligon v. City of New York,
No. 12-cv-2274 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012).
144. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141, at 1607–08 (explaining that the
majority of jurisdictions determine that a location is a high-crime area in
reliance on officer testimony, although some require additional
documentation or testimony to make the determination).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Horne, 386 F. App’x 313 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding
a defendant’s presence in a housing project in a high-crime area of Newark
relevant to reasonable suspicion analysis); United States v. See, 574 F.3d
309, 312 (6th Cir. 2009) (reiterating the district court findings that a
Cuyahoga County public housing complex “has a reputation for illicit
drug activity, domestic disturbances, robberies and assaults”); United
States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing a Richmond,
Virginia public housing project as a high-crime area); United States v.
Martin, 399 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 2005) (same in Inkster, Michigan); United
States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2002) (same in Nashville);
United States v. Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing
Dallas public housing complex as one with “a high incidence of drug
transactions,” in part because of FBI intelligence reports “revealing . . . a
high incidence of drug transactions”); United States v. Anderson, No. CR
11-0938 SBA, 2012 WL 3309696 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2012) (same in
Richmond, California); United States v. Williams, No. CR410-224, 2011
WL 765728, at *3 n.5 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 12, 2011) (noting that numerous
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especially likely for public and patrolled housing because of bias against
such locales and the people that live there. As noted above, perceptions
of disorder—and not necessarily actual levels of disorder—are strongly
correlated with race and class.146
Consequently, there is an automatic strike in favor of stopping
people who find themselves in public or patrolled housing, including
residents,147 that makes public and patrolled housing particularly
attractive locations to police for stop activity.148 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Utah v. Strieff149 has amplified this dynamic. There, the
Court refused to suppress the evidence gathered following an arrest
made pursuant to a warrant check that resulted from a stop made
without reasonable suspicion.150 It reasoned that the officer was merely
“negligent” when he stopped a person without reasonable suspicion and
conducted a warrant check, which revealed an outstanding arrest
warrant for a traffic violation.151 This decision plainly incentivizes police
to make suspicionless stops in places where they think they are likely
to encounter people with outstanding warrants.152 Although the
majority rejected the contention that its decision would result in
“dragnet searches” by police because of the availability of civil liability

federal cases established that public housing facilities in downtown
Savannah, Georgia were “high crime area[s] where drug activity and the
unlawful possession and use of firearms is commonplace”).
146. Sampson & Raudenbush, supra note 23, at 336.
147. Notably, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has not followed
suit under its state criminal procedure law. See Commonwealth v. Cruz,
945 N.E.2d 899, 907 (Mass. 2011) (holding a defendant’s presence on his
own street could not be found suspicious even though police officers
claimed that it was a high-crime area).
148. Aziz Huq has made a similar observation with regard to areas of
concentrated poverty generally. See Huq, supra note 9, at 2447–48, 2447
& nn.235–36 (expounding on Stuntz’s observation that criminal procedure
law creates “subsidies” for certain kinds of policing) (citing William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L.
Rev. 781, 782 (2006); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98
Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1821 (1998)).
149. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
150. Id. at 2064.
151. Id. at 2060, 2063.
152. In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor described the prevalence of outstanding
warrants. Id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Outstanding warrants
are surprisingly common . . . . The States and Federal Government
maintain databases with over 7.8 million outstanding warrants, the vast
majority of which appear to be for minor offenses.”).
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against police departments that do so,153 the difficulty of establishing
such liability makes this claim ring hollow.154
Together, mass criminalization, the low standard for conducting
stops on the basis of noncriminal infractions, and the high-crime area
doctrine make stopping people in and around public and patrolled
housing astonishingly easy. Identifying potential infractions is a simple
task, and even when clear violations of the myriad rules and regulations
governing life in public housing are not apparent, a law enforcement
officer does not face a difficult challenge in articulating “reasonable
suspicion” of some infraction when patrolling a high-crime area.155 And,
when police have specific authority to enter the common areas of
buildings that are typically not accessible to the public, the people they
encounter in them—doing their laundry, checking their mail, taking out
their garbage, and just going about their daily lives—may find
themselves stopped and forced to account for their presence.
B.

Arrest for Anything

Police also deploy arrest as a tool of control in public and patrolled
housing. Courts typically embrace the notion that police use arrests to
start criminal proceedings, but police have expansive authority to use
arrests for virtually any purpose. As Rachel Harmon has pointed out,
arrests serve a variety of purposes, e.g., to maintain order, to gather
evidence, and to deter crime.156 These purposes—as well as patently
illegitimate ones like asserting power or “Collars for Dollars” arrests
that allow officers to accrue overtime157—are all on display in public
and patrolled housing.
153. Id. at 2064 (citing Monell. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978)).
154. See Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 409,
430 (2016) (arguing that municipalities effectively enjoy sovereign
immunity because of the high causation standard for Section 1983 claims
brought against them under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services).
155. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141, at 1590–91.
156. Harmon, Why Arrest?, supra note 9, at 333–59. Josh Bowers has similarly
described the phenomenon of “non-law-enforcement searches and
seizures” as being “without uniform purpose or objective,” with some
being “mechanisms of ‘regulatory’ social control,” and “others of
‘community caretaking.’” Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognizable Point of a “Pointless Indignity,”
66 Stan. L. Rev. 987, 1005 (2014).
157. The “Collars for Dollars” phenomenon has been documented in several
American cities. See, e.g., Alan Feuer & Joseph Goldstein, The Arrest
Was a Bust. The Cops Got Overtime Anyway, N.Y. Times (Feb. 19,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/nyregion/new-york-policeovertime-pay-trial.html [https://perma.cc/8WNZ-CUD6] (describing the
arrest of bodega cashier who alleged that NYPD officers arrested him only
to pursue overtime and that it was a citywide practice); Lisa Getter et
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The Fourth Amendment poses no barrier to these uses of arrest in
public and patrolled housing because it asks only whether there was
probable cause for some offense at the time of arrest.158 As with stops,
given the wide range of rules and regulations that govern conduct
within and around public and patrolled housing, arrests are very easy
to produce. Accordingly, in public and patrolled housing, police utilize
arrests in response to the most minor of offenses in the hallways,
lobbies, and other common spaces.159 This practice undermines the
sanctity of the home, which is usually protected by the Fourth
Amendment.160
Through two cases, the Supreme Court opened the door to police
practices that utilize arrests for even very minor offenses: Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista,161 and Virginia v. Moore.162 In both, the Court
approved arrests for unquestionably trivial acts: driving without a
seatbelt and driving on a suspended license. Together, they signal that
the Court is unbothered by the high costs of arrest and, more
importantly, give law enforcement carte blanche to arrest for virtually
anything.
Atwater involved a proverbial “soccer mom”163 who was arrested for
failing to seat belt herself and her children.164 After the initial stop, the
officer “‘yell[ed]’ something to the effect of ‘[we]’ve met before’ and
‘[y]ou’re going to jail.’”165 He also denied Atwater’s request to “take her
‘frightened, upset, and crying’ children to a friend’s house nearby.”166
He then arrested Atwater and transported her to a local police station,
al., Innocent Caught in Web of Cops’ Overtime Abuse, Miami Herald
(July 15, 1997, 11:17 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/
article1929039.html [https://perma.cc/44JN-LGBV] (describing practice
in Miami); Peter Moskos, Collars for Dollars, Reason (June 29, 2011
10:30 a.m.), http://reason.com/archives/2011/06/29/collars-for-dollars
[https://perma.cc/96BK-RVNT] (describing practice in Baltimore).
158. See discussion infra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation
of the Baltimore City Police Dep’t 37–38 (2016); U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Newark Police
Department 21 (2014); Chase, supra note 105.
160. Stern, supra note 1, at 912–16.
161. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
162. 553 U.S. 164 (2008).
163. Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional
Carte Blanche, 77 Ind. L.J. 419, 419 (2002).
164. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323–24.
165. Id. at 324 (alterations in original).
166. Id. But, the Court noted “Atwater’s friend learned what was going on and
soon arrived to take charge of the children.” Id.
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where she was booked and held for “about one hour” before a bond
hearing.167 The officer who arrested her did so even though the
maximum punishment authorized by the Texas statute requiring seat
belts was a $50 fine.168
Although the Court recognized that “the physical incidents of arrest
were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who
was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment,”169 that did not stop
it from adopting a bright-line rule for judging the propriety of arrests
under the Fourth Amendment:
[T]he standard of probable cause “applie[s] to all arrests, without
the need to ‘balance’ the interests and circumstances involved in
particular situations.” . . . [Officers acting with probable cause
are] authorized . . . to make a custodial arrest without balancing
costs and benefits or determining whether or not [the] arrest was
in some sense necessary.170

That is, probable cause is sufficient to justify an arrest, regardless of
the circumstances.171 In short, “probable cause means never having to
give a reason.”172
Seven years later, in Virginia v. Moore, the Court doubled down
on its position that the Fourth Amendment poses no impediment to
arrests for minor offenses. There, police arrested a driver “for the
misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license, which is punishable
under Virginia law by a year in jail and a $2,500 fine.”173 A search
incident to arrest of the car revealed cash and a small amount of crack
cocaine.174 Moore sought to suppress the cash and cocaine because
167. Id.
168. Id. at 323 (citing Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.413(d) (West 1999)).
169. Id. at 346–47. Unsurprisingly, Justice O’Connor’s dissent on behalf of four
justices emphasized the majority’s recognition that the arrest was a
“‘pointless indignity’ that served no discernible state interest.” Id. at 360
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 354 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)).
171. Although the Court allowed that “individualized review” is appropriate
when an arrest “[i]s ‘conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to [the citizen’s] privacy or even physical interests,’” id. at 352–
53 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996)), it did not
explain what such circumstances might be. Given that the Atwater arrest
involved probable cause for a minor offense punishable by only a fine, as
well as “gratuitous humiliations,” id. at 346, it is difficult to think of a
scenario that would now be deemed “extraordinary.”
172. Bowers, supra note 156, at 1001.
173. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 167 (2008).
174. Id.
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“[u]nder state law, the officers should have issued Moore a summons
instead of arresting him.”175 Virginia’s explicit policy against arrest for
this minor offense had no bearing on the reasonableness of the officer’s
actions under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the majority reasoned
that “[a] State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the
range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more
restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable,
and hence unconstitutional.”176
Together, Atwater and Moore leave little doubt that arrests for
even the most minor infractions—even noncriminal ones—will survive
constitutional muster. Although some district courts have opined
otherwise,177 the weight of authority supports arrests in such
circumstances. This makes arrest readily available for use in public and
patrolled housing.
Remarkably, the Supreme Court expressed no concern about the
costs of arrests. Instead, the Atwater majority “wonder[ed] whether
warrantless misdemeanor arrests need constitutional attention, and
there [was] cause to the think the answer [was] no.”178 The evidence
cited in support of this conclusion was that judicial review of whether
there was probable cause to support any arrest is required within fortyeight hours, that at least eight states had “more restrictive safeguards
through statutes limiting warrantless arrests for minor offenses,” and
“it is in the interest of the police to limit petty-offense arrests, which
carry costs that are simply too great to incur without good reason.”179
Of course, the cited formal, legal safeguards say nothing about actual
practices of any police department. And Atwater itself did not support
the notion that police departments will be particularly proficient at
policing themselves to limit warrantless arrests for minor arrests.180
175. Id.
176. Id. at 174.
177. See, e.g., Glasgow v. Beary, 2 F. Supp. 3d 419, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“The
constitutionality of a full custodial arrest based only on probable cause
for a non-criminal traffic infraction is unclear and dubious.”); Smith v.
Kelly, No. C11-623RAJ, 2012 WL 1605123, at *5 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
(holding that the police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by
arresting the plaintiff for jaywalking, a noncriminal offense); Bostic v.
Rodriguez, 667 F. Supp. 2d 591, 609 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (holding that the
police officer violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by
arresting him for “remain[ing] belligerent” and “waving his hands” while
the plaintiff remained seated in his car).
178. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 351–52 (2001).
179. Id. at 352.
180. Richard Frase offered a compelling account of the deficiency of the Court’s
analysis, highlighting the virtual uselessness of probable cause hearings to
protect the interests of arrestees, who likely would prefer remaining free
to a prompt hearing reviewing their arrest. See Richard Frase, What Were
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In stark contrast to the Atwater majority’s position, there is no
doubt that police routinely make arrests for low level offenses. As
Wayne Logan has pointed out, case law supports this position, as does
the sheer volume of arrests for minor offenses.181 “An estimated ten
million misdemeanor cases are filed annually,”182 dwarfing the one
million felony convictions secured every year. As recounted in Part I,
many police departments have explicitly adopted order maintenance
strategies that explicitly aim to arrest a high number of people for minor
offenses.183
In sum, the Court has made clear that it has no Fourth Amendment
quarrel with arrests for almost anything that take place almost
anywhere besides the interior of a person’s home.184 When this broad
power is used in places where the laws or rules are wide-ranging, such
as in places where mass criminalization is the norm, the police have
virtually unchecked authority to arrest. Moreover, such arrests are
especially attractive when enforcement-oriented policing strategies are
favored.

They Thinking? Fouth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City
of Lago Vista, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 329, 365–68 (2002).
181. Logan, supra note 163, at 429–32.
182. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1314–15
(2012).
183. See supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. For example, the NYPD
alone has arrested a huge number of people for minor offenses in recent
years, roughly 200,000 people annually, reflecting a significant uptick since
the NYPD adopted Broken Windows policing strategies. Amanda Geller,
The Process Is Still the Punishment: Low-Level Arrests in the Broken
Windows Era, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1025, 1032 (2016) (highlighting data
showing that the number of misdemeanor arrests ranged from 189,630 to
236,857 between 2003 and 2012). “Between 1993 and 2010 the number of
misdemeanor arrests [by the NYPD] almost doubled.” Issa KohlerHaussman, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 Stan. L.
Rev. 611, 630 (2014). “At least two million arrests over the past two
decades are attributable to increased misdemeanor enforcement.” K. Babe
Howell, The Costs of Broken Windows Policing: Twenty Years and
Counting, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1059, 1063 (2016). The NYPD made
roughly an additional 200,000 nonfelony arrests in 2014 as compared to
1989. Id. And between 2000 and 2004, the NYPD arrested approximately
17,000 people annually for low level offenses not included in New York’s
Penal Law. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The
Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. Rev.
of L. & Soc. Change 271, 283 & n.65 [hereinafter Howell, Broken Lives
from Broken Windows].
184. And, as noted above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Heien v. North
Carolina allows arrests even when police are wrong about the law. See
supra note 123.
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C.

Search for Anything: The Search Incident to Arrest Exception to the
Warrant Requirement

An examination of the search incident to arrest exception to the
warrant requirement is also necessary to understand the diminished
Fourth Amendment rights of public and patrolled housing denizens.
Unlike the standards for stops and arrests, which are now fairly well
settled, this doctrine is in flux with a substantial split among lower
courts as to whether mere probable cause of an arrestable offense is
sufficient to trigger the exception to the warrant requirement, or
whether an actual arrest is required. Resolution of this question has
substantial ramifications for the right of people in public and patrolled
housing to be free from unreasonable searches.
It is accepted that a warrant generally is required before a police
officer conducts a search.185 The Supreme Court has observed that the
warrant requirement reflects the constitutional guarantee that a neutral
magistrate, rather than a police officer, ordinarily should decide
whether a search is justified:
The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not
to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal
activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the
need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals.186

Accordingly, the “basic rule” is that “searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”187
The Supreme Court first acknowledged the search incident to arrest
exception to the warrant requirement more than a century ago,188 but

185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[T]he police must, whenever
practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures
through the warrant procedure . . . .”).
186. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455–56 (1948).
187. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1968)); see also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
499 (1958) (explaining that Supreme Court has “jealously and carefully
drawn” only a few, narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement).
188. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (noting the “right
on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and
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confusion about its scope and meaning has reigned since. In 1969, the
Court attempted to clear up the confusion in Chimel v. California,189
when it held that the “proper extent” of a search incident to arrest is
“a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate
control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”190 This
rule significantly narrowed the scope of searches that had been
approved previously.191 But even with Chimel in place, “[b]y
design, . . . searches incident to arrest are both thorough and
invasive.”192
American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime”).
189. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
190. Id. at 762–63.
191. Over approximately the next fifty years following Weeks, the Court flipflopped as to whether the exception permitted a search of only the person
and the area immediately surrounding him or her, or a comprehensive
search of the location where the arrest was effected, including homes.
Compare United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950) (quoting
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392) (permitting a search of “the place where the
arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime”
as a search incident to arrest), and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947) (holding that the search of an apartment where an arrest was made
for forged checks met Fourth Amendment standards), and Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (upholding search of residence where
an arrest was made), and Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)
(noting, in dictum, permissibility of search of “the place where the arrest
is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its
fruits or as the means by which it was committed”), with Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (rejecting search of arrest site), and
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (holding search of desk
drawers and cabinet unlawful), and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931) (holding unlawful search of office where arrest
occurred), and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (holding that
officers lawfully searched an automobile based on probable cause that the
vehicle contained intoxicating liquor).
192. Seth W. Stoughton, Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory
Restriction of Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1727,
1768 (2011). Instructions for police officers on how to conduct a search
incident to arrest from “[a] widely circulated law enforcement text first
published in 1980” are illuminating:
Your search should be systematic, so you cover [the arrestee’s]
entire body from his head to his toes. A good place to look first is
around the suspect’s midriff . . . .
After checking the waist area, go to the top of his head and check
all areas down to his toes. Work from top to bottom, right to
left—and maintain the same search system on each suspect. That
way you won’t forget any area.
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The Court’s reasoning for limiting searches incident to arrest to the
arrestee’s person and area within his immediate control rested on the
justifications for the exception: ensuring that arrests are not
compromised, protecting arresting officers, and preventing the
destruction of evidence.193 That said, in United States v. Robinson,194
the Court definitively ruled that any arrest is sufficient to invoke the
exception, relying heavily on the notion that police officers face the risk
of violence and injury in taking potentially armed suspects into custody
no matter how minor the arrest charge.195 In Gustafson v. Florida,196 a
companion case to Robinson, the Court made clear that this rule
applied even without any concern about the destruction of evidence by
upholding the search of a driver arrested for a minor driver’s license

No area of the body or item of clothing should be immune from
searching. Adversaries have been known to carry guns in the
crotch of their pants . . . inside their hats . . . up their
sleeves . . . on cords around their necks . . . under coats and
vests . . . or fastened to their arms or legs by rubber bands or
tape. Sometimes, they hide them in slings and bandages . . . .
Others have carried guns taped in their arm pits or under their
breasts.
A favorite spot for concealing weapons, often overlooked, is inside
boots . . . .
Male officers (and female officers, too, for that matter) are often
reluctant to search a male suspect’s crotch area . . . .
Similarly, male officers may be hesitant about searching female
prisoners on the street . . . . In searching a female, first pull out
her blouse tail if it’s tucked in; sometimes guns or other weapons
will fall out. Also consider unsnapping her bra and shaking it by
its straps . . . . In checking between and under her breasts, on the
insides of her thighs and around her crotch, use the edge of your
hand. This can protect you against accusations of improper
advances.
Id. at 1768–69 (alterations in original) (quoting Ronald J. Adams et
al., Street Survival: Tactics for Armed Encounters 261–63
(1980)).
193. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. The Court also quoted Justice Frankfurter’s
observation that “the history and experience which [the Fourth
Amendment] embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils
to which it was a response” is the “test of reason which makes a search
reasonable.” Id. at 765 (quoting Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
194. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
195. Id. at 235.
196. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
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offense.197 In short, “it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to
the authority to search.”198
Wayne Logan aptly described the import of these rulings:
Taken together, Robinson and Gustafson marked a significant
advance in police authority to search incident to arrest. No longer
did the law require an evidentiary nexus between the items seized
and the basis for arrest; nor must there be a discernible threat to
officer safety. Police were freed to conduct full-body searches
subsequent to any arrest, and permitted to seize any and all
weapons or contraband they might find. In sum, for the first time,
the Court laid down a “bright-line rule” that tied search incident
authority to the occurrence of a “lawful custodial arrest,” without
regard to the factual particularities of the police-citizen
encounter.199

As noted above, the question that has more recently been
percolating through the lower courts regarding this exception is whether
mere probable cause of an arrestable offense is sufficient to trigger the
exception to the warrant requirement or whether an actual arrest is
required. In 1996, the Supreme Court arguably provided an answer to
that question in Knowles v. Iowa,200 when it held that the exception
was not properly applied when a police officer searched a motorist to
whom he had already issued a ticket for speeding.201 The officer had
intended to send the motorist on his way until “under the driver’s seat
he found a bag of marijuana and a ‘pot pipe,’”202 but instead an arrest
then followed the discovery.203 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held
that the two rationales for the search incident to arrest exception
identified in Robinson—“(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to
take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later

197. Id. at 265 (“It is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest
the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest and placed the
petitioner in custody . . . . [T]he arguable absence of ‘evidentiary’ purpose
for a search incident to a lawful arrest is not controlling.”).
198. Id. at 266.
199. Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to
Search Incident to Arrest, 19 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 381, 394 (2001)
(internal citations omitted).
200. 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
201. Id. at 114.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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use at trial”204—did not justify a search incident to citation.205 It
recognized that the interest in officer safety “[did] not by itself justify
the often considerably greater intrusion attending a full field-type
search.”206
Although Knowles appears to provide a clear answer (in the
negative) to the question of whether a search incident to mere probable
cause is permissible,207 its meaning has been debated extensively in the
lower courts. Of particular importance is the set of cases finding no
constitutional quarrel with “warrantless searches without initial arrests
simply when (1) probable cause to arrest exists independent of the fruits
of the search and (2) the arrest, conducted after the search, is deemed
broadly contemporaneous.”208 Those cases largely rest on Rawlings v.
Kentucky,209 in which the Supreme Court, seemingly unwittingly,
identified the contemporaneity of a search to an arrest as relevant to
the permissibility of a search incident to arrest, even though the search
preceded the defendant's arrest.210 In the nearly four decades since
Rawlings was decided, numerous courts have interpreted it to permit
searches incident to arrest that occurred before arrest, including when
there is little or no reason to believe that arrest was inevitable.211
204. Id. at 116 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973)).
205. Id. at 117.
206. Id.
207. Wayne Logan has pointed out that the Court’s decision in Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) also supports the notion that a custodial
arrest must have been effectuated for the search incident to arrest
exception to apply. Logan, supra note 199, at 406 & n.163 (citing Cupp,
412 U.S. at 296 (“Where there is no formal arrest, . . . a person might
well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous,
immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence on his person. . . . [W]e
do not hold that a full Chimel search would have been
justified . . . without a formal arrest and without a warrant.”)).
208. Logan, supra note 199, at 408.
209. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
210. Id. at 111. There, after detaining people at a house where they had
intended to arrest another man on drug charges, police searched a purse
and discovered drugs. Id. at 100–01. After a man identified the drugs as
his, the officers searched him and discovered additional contraband. Id.
at 101.
211. Logan collected cases reflecting this phenomenon as of 2001. See Logan,
supra note 199, at 408 n.171. More recent appellate cases reflecting this
trend include the following: United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.
2017); United States v. Powell, 483 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc);
United States v. Currence, 446 F.3d 554, 557 (4th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Knop v. State,
No. 11-0692, 2012 WL 3589980, at *3–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012)
(finding that the pre-arrest search of the defendant was valid because the
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The risk that this doctrine poses to residents and visitors of public
and patrolled housing is grave. United States v. Diaz,212 recently decided
by the Second Circuit, illustrates this dynamic well. It involved a search
followed by arrest in the patrolled hallway of a Bronx private apartment
building enrolled in the Trespass Affidavit Program/Operation Clean
Halls.213 As noted above, the Clean Halls program allows NYPD officers
to patrol the hallways and other common areas of private apartment
buildings.214 In Diaz, the defendant was “sitting next to a bottle of
vodka and holding a red plastic cup.”215 At a suppression hearing, the
officer who ultimately arrested Diaz testified that “she did not initially
intend to arrest Diaz, only to issue him a summons for violating New
York’s open-container law.”216 After ordering him to stand and produce
identification, Diaz’s “fumbl[ing] with his hands in his jacket pockets
and rearrang[ing] his waistband,” inspired the officer to frisk Diaz,
revealing a gun.217 Upon discovery, he was arrested.218
In heavy reliance on Rawlings and prior Second Circuit precedent,
the Second Circuit concluded that the frisk was properly considered a
search incident to arrest.219 It distinguished Knowles because the search

officers had “probable cause to arrest [the defendant] for . . . traffic
violations” at the time of the search); State v. Sherman, 931 So.2d 286,
297 (La. 2006) (holding that where police have probable cause to arrest
and conduct a search incident to arrest, “the fruits of that search may not
be suppressed merely because the police did not intend to arrest the
suspect for the offense for which probable cause existed”); State v. O’Neal,
921 A.2d 1079, 1086–87 (N.J. 2007) (holding that a warrantless search of
the defendant was lawful because the police officers had probable cause
at the time of the search to arrest the defendant for a drug offense, even
though the search preceded the arrest). But see Ochana v. Flores, 347
F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, it is legal to search a vehicle
incident to a lawful custodial arrest” but a “traffic citation alone” does
not justify such a search, “even if there is probable course for the traffic
stop, or probable cause to arrest the driver for the traffic violation.”);
Belote v. State, 981 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Md. 2009) (“Where there is no
custodial arrest, however, these underlying rationales for a search incident
to arrest do not exist.”).
212. 854 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2017).
213. Id. at 200–01.
214. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
215. Diaz, 854 F.3d at 200.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 200–01.
218. Id. at 201.
219. Id. at 205–09 (discussing United States v. Ricard, 563 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
1977)). The court declined to address whether the frisk was lawful
pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 1 (1968). Diaz, 854 F.3d at 209 n.16.
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at issue took place before the officer issued a ticket.220 In the Diaz
encounter, it “thus remained uncertain . . . whether the encounter
would lead to an arrest; the dangers to the officer that accompany the
prospect of arrest therefore remained present.”221 It further re-casts the
description of officer safety concerns in Robinson and Knowles as ones
attendant to encounters where there is the possibility of arrest rather
than actual arrests.222
Diaz is emblematic of how Fourth Amendment law and targeted or
hot spots policing practices combine to result in extraordinarily weak
protections for people who live in or frequent hot spots, including public
or patrolled housing, targeted by police. Pursuant to Diaz, police
officers in the Second Circuit are free to search people on the basis of
probable cause of some arrestable offense without fear that any evidence
recovered will be suppressed.223 Thus, people who live in patrolled
housing who, like all people, are very likely to commit some offense in
or around their homes, are subject to extensive searches “incident to
arrest” even if they are never arrested and the searching officer never
intended to arrest them.224 The likelihood of committing such
infractions is especially high because mass criminalization is at work,
effectively providing law enforcement with carte blanche to search
people.225
220. Id. at 206.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 207 (“Where there is a basis for an arrest, an officer has reason to
be concerned for her safety until she issues a citation and the stop ends.”).
223. Because New York’s highest court ruled differently on this issue, police
departments within New York may not be instructing their officers to
exploit this doctrine. See People v. Reid, 26 N.E.3d 237, 240 (N.Y. 2014)
(“Where no arrest has yet taken place, the officer must have intended to
make one if the ‘search incident’ exception is to . . . app[ly].”).
224. It is worth noting that Diaz and similar cases leave open the possibility
that a court could find a police officer personally liable for violating the
Fourth Amendment if she conducted a search on the basis of mere
probable cause, but an arrest did not immediately follow. Such claims
would likely arise in a Section 1983 action. See, e.g., Bennett v. City of
Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 824 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting, in a Section 1983
action, that the search incident to arrest exception did not apply to frisk
of youths stopped by police officers for “riding double” because there was
no actual arrest). But Section 1983 actions often fail to deter police
misconduct. See Carbado, supra note 12, at 519–24 (explaining why the
qualified immunity doctrine and indemnification practices limit liability
against police officers in Section 1983 cases).
225. Tracey Maclin’s description of why such searches gain attention
infrequently is instructive:
[Searches] are low-visibility affairs. Even though individual
privacy has been invaded, individuals subjected to such searches
are not likely to complain because it is probably not worth the
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Policing Public and Patrolled Housing in New York City: “Just Go
to the Well”226

The experience in New York City is useful for an examination of
how these Fourth Amendment doctrines, which are already
acknowledged to provide weak protection for the urban poor, can be
exploited by police departments intent on using their maximum
authority in places they deem problematic. The New York City Police
Department’s recent practices in both public and private housing offer
a window into how a police focus on hot spots can operate to the
detriment of Fourth Amendment protection for those who live in or
frequent locations targeted by police.227 Given that hot spots policing is
not one-size-fits-all, no case study can or should be considered
emblematic of how any particular police department will implement its
chosen hot spots strategy.228 But the New York City experience
illustrates how an order maintenance approach in combination with the
limited legal rights and special rules that apply in public and patrolled
housing make the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures effectively vanish.
Spread-out over 175,000 apartments in five boroughs,
approximately 400,000 people live in public housing developments
operated by the New York City Housing Authority (“NYCHA”).229
And, like other locales, policing practices in NYHCA are rooted in part
in the public perception of public housing as a major site of urban
disorder and criminality in New York City. Policing practices in and

bother. As a result, these searches are not likely to be brought to
the attention of police supervisors, nor are they likely to merit the
concern of politicians or the press. Police officers understand this
phenomenon. As a result, they know they have carte blanche to
undertake these searches just about whenever they please.
Maclin, supra note 2, at 244.
226. Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y.
Times (July 11, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/nyregion/
12frisk.html [https://perma.cc/WXY8-8LEA].
227. See Davis v. City of New York (Davis II), 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Davis v. City of New York (Davis I), 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
228. As explained above, some police departments implement hot spots
policing using order-maintenance policing strategies, while others focus on
problem-oriented policing or community policing. See supra notes 84–97
and accompanying text.
229. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., NYCHA 2018 Fact Sheet 1 (2018), https://
www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/NYCHA-Fact-Sheet_2018_
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SM8-PRT6].
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around NYHCA developments are partly responsible for that
perception.
The role of the NYPD in NYCHA developments has evolved over
time. Until it merged with the NYPD in 1995, NYCHA had its own
police force, the Housing Authority Police Department (“HAPD”).230
HAPD members historically enjoyed strong relationships with NYCHA
residents and utilized an approach that most strongly resembles
community policing.231 One important aspect of the HAPD’s strategies
was its hyper-local assignment of officers to particular developments for
years at a time, allowing them to develop relationships with residents.232
The HAPD moved to embrace Broken Windows strategies in the 1980s
and early 1990s as drug problems reached epidemic levels. Its embrace
of HUD’s Drug Elimination Program is a good example. As noted
above, this HUD program provided funds to local public housing
authorities to combat drug use and crime.233 As implemented in New
York City, the biggest component of the Drug Elimination Program
was Operation Safe Home, which “focused on increasing the presence
of uniformed officers and law enforcement activities . . . with the goal
of providing a more secure living environment . . . by combating serious
crime.”234 The chief method used to reach that goal was frequent patrols
by teams of officers designed to “‘take back’ a development building by
building.”235 The program grew from forty-eight officers in 1991 to 400
officers and fifty-seven sergeants in 1995, when the NYCHA police force
merged with the NYPD.236
The NYPD maintained the focus on frequent patrols and other
Broken Windows strategies after HUD ended the Drug Elimination
Program. Since 1995, the NYPD has provided all police services in
NYCHA, including both “baseline,” i.e., “ordinary and routine” police
services, as well as specialized “above Baseline Services.”237 The NYPD
230. Fritz Umbach, The Last Neighborhood Cops: The Rise and Fall
of Community Policing in New York Public Housing 161 (2011).
231. Id. at 47–52 (describing HAPD’s practices between 1960 and 1980).
232. Id.
233. Fagan et al., Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, supra
note 9, at 423 (“The primary goal of DEP was to reduce drug use, drug
sale, drug-related crime and collateral crime problems by strengthening
both formal and informal social control in public housing developments.”).
234. Id. at 427.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 427–28.
237. Memorandum of Understanding between the New York City Housing
Authority and the City of New York on Merger of the New York City
Housing Authority Police Department and the New York City Police
Department at 7, Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1994)
(1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP), ECF No.176-1 [hereinafter NYCHA MOU].
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is also the entity designated to enforce NYCHA’s “House Rules,”238
which embrace all manner of behavior, including some that seem
intended to mimic criminal law, such as bars on trespassing and entry
into restricted areas.239 For example, until recent litigation, the
NYCHA’s House Rules banned “lingering,” a rule so vague that
enforcement depended on the predilections of the officer on patrol.240
But the House Rules also cover issues that one would not expect the
police to address, such as waste disposal, moving permits, TV antenna
installation, and barbecue permits.241
As described above, certain private apartment buildings in New
York City are also the sites of an intense police presence. Through the
Trespass Affidavit Program (“TAP”), also known as Operation Clean
Halls, the NYPD receives permission from private landlords to patrol
the common areas of apartment buildings.242 The original focus of the
program was “narcotics sales taking place in the common areas of
private buildings, such as lobbies, stairwells, and rooftops.”243 It later
expanded to include other criminal activity and quality of life offenses
in the buildings.244

NYCHA has paid tens of millions of dollars for “above Baseline” services
annually, such as its vertical patrol program and additional narcotics
enforcement and patrol services. Id. (describing above baseline services);
Amended Complaint at 43, Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(No. 1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP) (payments ranged between $58 million and
$88 million from 1995 to 2008).
238. NYCHA MOU at 8–9 (“The City, through its police officers, is hereby
empowered to enforce such NYCHA rules and regulations and perform
such other duties as shall be determined from time to time by the City
and NYCHA.”).
239. See NYCHA Highlights of House Rules, Lease Terms and Policy, Davis
II, No. 1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012) ECF 194-28.
240. According to an anonymous housing commander, “‘Getting your mail,
that’s not lingering . . . . But if you’re hanging out with your friends, or
sitting in the stairways for a period of time, that’s lingering.’” J. David
Goodman, Police Patrols in New York Public Housing Draw Scrutiny, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/nyregion/
amid-calls-for-police-reform-little-scrutiny-of-public-housing-patrols.html
[https://perma.cc/R7NR-9PXP]. NYCHA agreed to remove the ban on
lingering from its House Rules pursuant to the settlement of a class action.
Stipulation of Settlement and Order at 10, Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2015) (No. 1:10-cv-00699-AT-HBP).
241. NYCHA Highlights of House Rules, Lease Terms and Policy, supra note
239, at 2, 3.
242. Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 484–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
243. Id. at 517 (internal citations omitted).
244. Id. at 517–18.
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One policing tactic common to both NYCHA and TAP buildings is
the use of “vertical patrols.” Such patrols “consist of two or more police
officers combing the interior of a . . . building—from roof to
basement—in an attempt to locate and apprehend trespassers, drug
dealers, and other criminals.”245 In NYCHA buildings alone, the NYPD
conducts hundreds of thousands of vertical patrols each year.246 And in
both and NYCHA and TAP buildings, the NYPD is often a regular
presence, encountering residents and their visitors inside and around
the buildings, to the point that some residents have described the
NYPD as an occupying force.247
The New York experience lays bare the weakness of Fourth
Amendment protections for those who reside in and frequent patrolled
housing. Two recent class actions challenged the NYPD’s NYCHA and
TAP stop and trespass arrest practices, which were developed in the
late 2000s.248 Although the cases challenged practices as violative of the
Fourth Amendment, they also revealed troubling stops and arrests that
were perfectly lawful. For example, a NYCHA resident was stopped,
frisked, and ultimately arrested, along with his friend, because he was
sitting on his own building’s “roof landing,” the platform on the top of
the stairwell that is connected to the roof through a door.”249 Given
that the New York Penal Law specifically bans trespassing in public
housing buildings where there are “conspicuously posted rules or
regulations governing entry and use,”250 the argument about the arrest’s
legality turned on whether the plaintiff and his guest had adequate
245. Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 Colum. L. Rev.
2002, 2003 (2009).
246. Id.
247. A federal court quoted the following statement of a NYCHA resident
leadership group’s president:
[W]henever I have an opportunity to talk to someone in law
enforcement who might listen, my question to them is: Suppose I
came into your neighborhood tonight and you were in civilian
attire and you were on your way to the store to get milk and
cookies for your kids, and I stopped you the way some of your
personnel do, what would you do? How would you feel about that?
...
When this type of practice is instituted and done to people on a
regular basis . . . I use the term “penal colony,” it’s almost like
we have been colonized for a decade.
Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324, 333–34.
248. See Davis II, 959 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ligon, 925 F. Supp.
2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Davis I, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
249. Davis I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 419 & n.78.
250. N.Y. Penal Law § 140.10(e) (McKinney 2019).
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notice that the roof landing was an area where a person’s presence was
prohibited.251 With sufficient notice, the arrest of the resident on his
own building’s roof landing would have been valid. Similarly, a young
Bronx man was legally stopped when he, his cousin, and a friend
approached his grandmother’s TAP building and “knocked loudly”
because they didn’t have a key.252 These cases of lawful encounters,
along with the dozens of unlawful ones at the heart of the cases,253 reveal
that the NYPD did not hesitate to detain and question people in and
around NYCHA and TAP buildings. It was so easy to identify the
grounds for conducting stops in NYCHA buildings that one NYPD
supervisor instructed officers to “[j]ust go the well”—the lobbies of
public housing buildings—to locate people to stop.254 As one NYCHA
resident summarized the situation: “‘If you’re standing in front of the
building, you can’t do that . . . . You can’t sit in the park after dusk.
They don’t let you do much around here.’”255 Ultimately, the district
court found that NYPD’s training regarding TAP “taught officers the
following lesson: stop and question first, develop reasonable suspicion
later.”256
Many residents of public and patrolled housing in New York City
have had experiences similar to the plaintiffs’. According to surveys
conducted by a non-profit legal organization in 2008, 72 percent of
residents surveyed in one public housing project reported that they had
been stopped by NYPD officers, including 41 percent who were stopped

251. Davis I, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 420–22. NYCHA later issued a document
titled “Highlights of House Rules, Lease Terms and Policy,” to clarify that
presence on roof landings was barred. Id. at 422.
252. Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 504, 526 & n.346 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). He was also
frisked—which turned into an extensive and illegal search, involving the
removal of his pocket’s contents. Id. at 505.
253. For example, in Ligon v. City of New York, concerning TAP, the district
court found that nine of the eleven stops about which the plaintiffs offered
testimony were illegal. Id. at 526. The court also cited an analysis of the
NYPD’s records of stops, demonstrating at least 400 stops in a single year
made because of mere presence outside of TAP buildings, and over two
dozen affidavits prepared by the Bronx District Attorney’s Office
documenting decisions to decline to prosecute arrested persons who were
stopped solely because they were entering, exiting, or simply near TAP
buildings in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 545–49; Report of
Plaintiff’s Expert Dr. Jeffrey Fagan, Ligon v. City of New York, 925 F.
Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-02274-SAS-HBP),
ECF 44-5.
254. Rivera et al., supra note 226.
255. Goodman, supra note 240.
256. Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
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up to five times per year.257 In another development, 63 percent of
residents who reported having been stopped had been stopped at least
once in the previous year.258 In response to a 2011 survey of NYCHA
residents, one-third reported that they or a family member “ha[d] been
stopped by police in his/her own building or development.”259 In recent
focus groups and community forums held as part of the “Joint Remedial
Process” that followed resolution of the cases, NYCHA residents
communicated that they “often felt overly surveilled and heavily
policed.”260
Thus, even following high-profile class actions, the lack of effective
Fourth Amendment limits allows the NYPD to utilize aggressive
enforcement practices in NYCHA and TAP buildings. Once inside or
on the grounds of a NYCHA or TAP building, the NYPD continues to
have authority to enforce federal, state, and local laws, no matter how
trivial. Although New York law permits stops only when misdemeanors
and felonies are suspected,261 it allows police officers to arrest for any
“offense,” including non-criminal ones.262 Following Atwater and Moore,
this New York law almost certainly complies with the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, an officer may approach a person for the
purpose of issuing a citation or conducting an arrest for virtually
anything—e.g., smoking cigarettes, littering, or riding a bicycle on the
sidewalk—and the encounter may well end with a criminal case and all
of its associated costs. In short, when the NYPD targets public and
patrolled housing, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against
unreasonable seizures is effectively non-existent.

257. New York Lawyers for the Public Interest, No Place Like
Home 10 (2008).
258. Id. at 12.
259. CAAAV: Organizing Asian Cmtys. et al., A Report Card for the
New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) 10 (2011).
260. Ariel E. Belen et al., New York City Joint Remedial Process
on NYPD’s Stop, Question, and Frisk, and Trespass
Enforcement Policies, Final Report and Recommendations 264
(2018), https://www.jamsadr.com/files/uploads/documents/articles/belennew-york-city-joint-remedial-process-may-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4QM4G7Q].
261. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2016).
262. See § 140.10(1)(a) (allowing arrest by police officer for “[a]ny offense when
he or she has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed
such offense in his or her presence”); People v. Taylor, 294 A.D. 2d 825
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (upholding arrest for violation of non-criminal open
container ordinance); People v. Lewis, 50 A.D.3d 595 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008) (upholding arrest for violation of two sections of New York City
Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, both non-criminal offenses).
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The New York City example, revealing abuses similar in kind to
those exposed by Justice Department investigations in Baltimore and
Newark and private litigation in numerous other cities,263 demonstrates
that targeted policing in public and patrolled housing does not always
inure to the benefit of residents and others who find themselves in and
around hot spots for legitimate reasons. Although hot spots policing
sounds “smart” in concept, getting stopped, arrested, and searched by
police in your own building is anything but. Unsurprisingly, the New
York City example and others show that when mass criminalization is
exploited, hot spots policing techniques are not always met with
approval by the communities where they are implemented. Although
residents of housing complexes plagued by crime surely want safety and
security, they are also sometimes confronted with substantial
limitations on their Fourth Amendment rights.

III. Mass Criminalization in Public and Patrolled
Housing and Fourth Amendment Values
The costs of mass criminalization and policing strategies targeted
at public and patrolled housing are high. On a macro level,
programmatic stop and frisk, arrests, and searches create alienation
between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve,
undermine the legitimacy of the police department and entire justice
system, promote stereotypes about people of color, direct funds towards
the criminal justice system rather than other services, and harm public
health.264
The toll on individuals can be extraordinarily steep as well. Even
when they face only minor charges, those who are arrested face
especially significant consequences, both direct and collateral.265
263. See supra notes 59–75 and accompanying text.
264. See Cooper, supra note 7, at 21–26 (describing use of racial profiling by
NYPD and social control of young black and Latinx males as a result of
programmatic stop and frisk); M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and
Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing as a Form of
Collective Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 Drexel L. Rev.
373, 410–11 (2011) (describing the “critical mass of harms” that result
from order maintenance policing); Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive
Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban Men, 104 Am. J. Pub.
Health 2321, 2321 (2014) (describing survey results indicating that
young men in New York City who reported more police contact pursuant
to NYPD stop and frisk policy also reported more trauma and anxiety);
Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, supra note 183, at 306–12
(describing community-level harms of zero tolerance policing).
265. See Fabricant, supra note 264, at 407–09 (describing consequences of
convictions); Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows, supra note 183
at 293–306 (same); Huq, supra note 9, at 2429–39 (same); Natapoff, supra
note 182, at 1323–27 (same); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:
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Conviction is not necessary; mere arrests can cause significant harm,
such as the loss of a job or home.266 This risk is amplified in public
housing. HUD requires public housing agencies to utilize lease terms
that subject a tenant to eviction if a member of the tenant’s household
or a guest engages in criminal activity, whether on or off the premises
of the housing development.267 A public housing agency may pursue
eviction even when the tenant is completely unaware of the household
member’s criminal or drug activity.268 With this draconian lease
provision, it is easy to see how police encounters in public housing could
lead to eviction, a traumatizing event.269 In the same vein, relatively
low level criminal charges frequently result in probation, and probation

Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 277, 297–306 (2011) (same).
266. Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 809, 852–54 (2015)
(describing collateral consequences of arrests and recounting tale of Bronx
man, a plaintiff in Ligon v. City of New York, whose job was jeopardized
following an arrest for trespassing in patrolled housing due to automatic
suspension of his security guard license upon arrest); Michael Pinard,
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 457, 491–92 (2010) (detailing how
arrest or conviction can affect access to housing).
267. HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (interpreting statutory provision
that allows eviction because of a conviction for “any criminal activity that
threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises
by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity”) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)).
268. Id. at 136 (holding that the statute “requires lease terms that give local
public housing authorities the discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant
when a member of the household or a guest engages in drug-related
activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or should have known, of
the drug-related activity”).
269. In his ethnographic study of families facing eviction and its aftermath in
Milwaukee, Matthew Desmond evocatively summarized the impact of
eviction as follows:
Losing your home and possessions and often your job; being
stamped with an eviction record and denied government housing
assistance; relocating to degrading housing in poor and dangerous
neighborhoods; and suffering from increased material hardship,
homelessness, depression, and illness—this is eviction’s fallout.
Eviction does not simply drop poor families into a dark valley, a
trying yet relatively brief detour on life’s journey. It
fundamentally redirects their way, casting them onto a different,
and much more difficult, path. Eviction is a cause, not just a
condition, of poverty.
Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the
American City 298–99 (2016).
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violations require eviction from public housing.270 Far from making
home a refuge, the risk of encounters with police officers are uniquely
high in public housing.271
In addition, certain community-wide harms of order maintenance
policing are especially significant in public and patrolled housing. In
particular, two previously identified by Aziz Huq with regard to
programmatic stop and frisk generally are noteworthy. First, there is
the notion that negative experiences with the criminal justice system
“dampen[] . . . civic participation . . . in ways that, over time, conduce
to diminished political power.”272 Specifically, “contact with the
criminal justice system, including nonconsensual stops, has a
substantial and statistically significant effect on trust in government,”
reducing the likelihood of voting.273 Political power does not usually
reside with the low-income residents of public and patrolled housing, a
historically marginalized group.274 Policing practices that further
diminish it mean that the political priorities of residents of public and
patrolled housing are given short shrift. A brief example from Harlem
is illustrative. There, in response to growing tensions and fears of
violence, a group of public housing residents from two developments
called for services and programs for youth in their communities.275 Their

270. Gustafson, supra note 99, at 667 n.109 (citing Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, Title
IX, § 903, 110 Stat. 2185, 2348–49 (1996) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (2012))).
271. It is noteworthy that minimal process is typically available to address
minor criminal charges. Arrests for misdemeanors and other minor
infractions often result in quick guilty pleas, and consequently, no
meaningful opportunities to challenge the constitutionality of the actions
that ultimately led to arrest. See Natapoff, supra note 182, at 1345–47.
Officers’ actions escape challenge when suppression hearings, the primary
vehicle used to challenge the constitutionality of searches and seizures,
simply do not happen.
272. Huq, supra note 9, at 2437–38.
273. Id. at 2438 (citing Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting
Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime
Control 150–51 (2014)).
274. See Mary Pattillo, Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods “As Is,” in
Public Housing and the Legacy of Segregation 31–46 (Margery
Austin Turner, Susan J. Popkin & Lynette Rawlings, eds., 2009)
(describing lack of political influence of low income tenants); Leonard
Freedman, Public Housing: The Politics of Poverty 200–01 (1969)
(same with respect to public housing residents).
275. Harlem Residents: We Asked the City for Help, We Got a Raid Instead,
Juvenile Justice Info. Exch., (June 5, 2014), https://jjie.org/2014/06/
05/harlem-residents-we-asked-city-for-help-we-got-a-raid-instead/107031/
[https://perma.cc/8BUX-9TFY]; Jennifer Gonnerman, A Daughter’s Death,
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efforts went unheeded, and instead, the NYPD and Manhattan District
Attorney’s office conducted a massive raid of the developments—then
the biggest in New York City history—which resulted in over forty
arrests.276
Second, Huq pointed to a reduction in “collective efficacy” for
communities bearing the brunt of programmatic stop and frisk, i.e.,
“‘the linkage of mutual trust and the shared willingness to
intervene.’”277 Collective efficacy creates social control that addresses
crime.278 This could be especially useful in public and patrolled housing,
where community members have regular and repeated contact with
each other; all benefit when they can rely on each other to help preserve
safety and security. Police practices that operate to impede collective
efficacy have obvious deleterious effects. This is particularly noteworthy
given that one study indicates that experiencing frequent police stops
and police intrusiveness during stops can predict criminal behavior by
those subjected to the stops.279 Overall, the community-wide harms
generally associated with order maintenance practices are concentrated
and localized such that the marginalization of the residents of public
and patrolled housing is further cemented.
In sum, the Fourth Amendment functions in public and patrolled
housing to support the use of order-maintenance police practices that
further marginalize impoverished communities. The powers to stop,
arrest, and search are extraordinary under modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, and together, they are highly dangerous for the rights of
people who could easily commit noncriminal infractions in places where
mass criminalization is in play, such as public and patrolled housing.
Fourth Amendment law also does nothing to impede the importation
of pernicious racial stereotypes and in fact allows them to flourish by
permitting pretextual stops. Indeed, through (low) bright-line
standards that allow stops, arrests, and searches for virtually anything,

New Yorker (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2015/10/05/a-daughters-death [https://perma.cc/33AZ-BN2N].
276. J. David Goodman, Dozens of Gang Suspects Held in Raids in Manhattan,
N.Y. Times (June 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/
nyregion/dozens-of-suspected-gang-members-arrested-in-raid-of-2-harlemhousing-projects.html [https://perma.cc/C7BR-SMF9].
277. Huq, supra note 9, at 2438 (quoting Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood
Effects, Causal Mechanisms, and the Social Structure in the City, in
Analytic Sociology and Soc. Mechanisms 227, 232 (Pierre
Demeulenaere, ed., 2011)).
278. Id.
279. Tom R. Tyler et al., Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable
Moments in Young Urban Men’s Legal Socialization, 11 J. of Empirical
Legal Stud. 751, 773–74 (2014) (finding that frequency of stops and
police intrusiveness during stops were “significant predictors of criminal
behavior”).
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Fourth Amendment law facilities police actions made on the basis of
such stereotypes and permits the use of the criminal justice system to
impose social control on an unpopular group.

IV. Providing Protection and Restoring Dignity to
Public and Patrolled Housing Residents
Only complex answers are available to the challenging question of
how to address the legal deficiencies that allow public and patrolled
housing to become occupied territories in ways that completely bely
traditional notions of the sanctity of the home. This Article suggests
that they rest in three categories: rethinking Fourth Amendment
standards so that they reflect the traditional protection for the home;
limiting the authority of local and state actors through the adoption of
state constitutional and legal standards that reject the cramped
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment; and devising local policies
to reject targeted and hot spots strategies that resemble occupation.
Each is amplified below.
A.

Answering Open Questions of Fourth Amendment Law

A key reason for the weak Fourth Amendment protection of public
and patrolled housing residents is the Supreme Court’s traditional focus
on searches rather than seizures. The Court has developed numerous
standards with searches in mind rather than seizures. As Lauryn Goldin
has observed, seizures are the “neglected sibling” in Fourth Amendment
law.280 The cost of the Supreme Court’s inattention to the interests at
stake in defining Fourth Amendment standards for seizures rather than
searches has an ever-expanding universe of conditions under which
seizures may take place.
Two clarifications of Fourth Amendment law would significantly
improve constitutional protections for residents of public and patrolled
housing such that the Supreme Court’s avowed protection for the home
is more consistent. First, courts should clarify that Terry stops are not
permitted when law enforcement officers suspect only noncriminal
infractions. Second, courts should make clear that the search incident
arrest exception to the warrant requirement applies only when an arrest
actually takes place. These areas are particularly important because
both are gateways to greater intrusions in contravention of fundamental
Fourth Amendment interests.281
280. Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 Denv. L. Rev.
53, 59 (2015).
281. This Article has identified several other areas of Fourth Amendment law
that allow significant intrusions by law enforcement officers into the lives
of public and patrolled housing residents. Because others have offered
extensive critiques of these issues and offered laudable suggestions for
doctrinal improvements, this Article does not propose additional
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In contrast with a “consensual encounter” that a “reasonable
person” feels they can terminate at any point, a Terry stop constitutes
a significant show of police authority. When an officer may claim that
a person is not free to leave—the sine qua non of a Terry stop—further
incursions on the stopped person’s freedom of movement and privacy
can quickly follow. The initiation of a Terry stop allows an officer to
ask invasive questions, run a records check, or perhaps demand that
the stopped person stand in the hallway outside their door. Frisks also
frequently accompany stops, even greater invasions of personal space,
privacy, and autonomy.282 Given that the fundamental justification for
Terry stops—crime control—is unavailable, stop authority should be
unavailable as well.
In addition, since infractions are, by definition, exceedingly minor
violations of the law, investigations of the type permitted by Terry are
simply unnecessary. In Terry itself, Officer McFadden suspected a
serious crime—burglary—that virtually all would agree warrants police
attention. In stark contrast, public urination, loitering, and other
typical minor infractions are not occurrences that require investigation
of any kind; if a police officer observes such an offending behavior, they
usually may address it by issuing a ticket or summons on the spot; the
questioning and records checking that typically accompany Terry stops
are simply unnecessary. As noted above, some states’ laws recognize as
much, barring stops unless felonies or certain misdemeanors are
suspected.283
The minor infractions that fit this category can be distinguished
from the traffic infractions for which courts have usually permitted
stops.284 At least traffic laws have some safety rationale; the same
cannot always be said for minor infractions of the type often enforced
in public and patrolled housing.285 Moreover, given that Terry
represents a significant deviation from the Fourth Amendment
standards for seizures and the intrusions it creates can be substantial,
its expanded application should not be assumed.
Similarly, the expansive search authority that some police
departments assert once an officer has mere probable cause of an
observations in those areas. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 141
(offering suggestions for clarifying and improving the high-crime area
doctrine); Frase, supra note 180 (same for arrest authority for minor
infractions); Logan, supra note 163 (same for arrest authority for minor
infractions).
282. See, e.g., Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion, supra note 6, at 684.
283. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
284. See Woods, supra note 120, at 712–13 & n.181 (collecting cases).
285. This suggestion is not meant to downplay the significant intrusions that
car stops often constitute and the even greater ones to which they often
lead. See generally Harris, supra note 122.
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arrestable offense leads to significant infringements on Fourth
Amendment rights and should be cabined. Instead of simply being
questioned, which alone can be harassing, searches are often intense
physical invasions.286 Wayne Logan has suggested that the trigger for
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
should therefore be the “intent-manifestation” approach, i.e., whether
an officer has demonstrated both an intent to arrest and whether there
is evidence of “an officer’s intent to follow through with the
prosecution.”287 The California Supreme Court utilized a similar
approach when it held that the search incident exception did not apply
to a search that followed a stop of a bicyclist for failing to stop at a
stop sign.288 New York’s Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court,
has adopted part of this test permitting application of the exception
only when an officer intends to make an arrest.289 Either of these
approaches is a significant improvement over the free-for-all that ensues
when courts permit application of the search incident to arrest
exception merely because an officer identified probable cause of an
arrestable offense.290
B.

State Law

Answers to the problem of hyper-aggressive policing in public and
patrolled housing also lie at the state level. In particular, state law—
286. See Stoughton, supra note 192, at 1768.
287. Logan, supra note 199, at 434.
288. People v. Macabeo, 384 P.3d 1189, 1219 (Cal. 2016) (holding that search
incident exception did not apply, in part because there were no “objective
indicia to suggest . . . that the officers would have arrested defendant in
violation of state law”).
289. See People v. Reid, 26 N.E.3d 237, 240 (N.Y. 2014) (“Where no arrest
has yet taken place, the officer must have intended to make one if the
‘search incident’ exception is to be applied.”).
290. Another option to address the Fourth Amendment’s facilitation of
aggressive policing in public and patrolled housing would be to revamp
the key standards that underlie it. In particular, courts could develop
standards that account for the special status of the home such that the
treatment of people who in public and patrolled housing does not differ
so wildly from residents of private homes. Fundamentally, such a change
would rest on reconceptualizing the idea of “home” and the areas where
residents are entitled to higher presumptions of Fourth Amendment
protection. As noted above, the thresholds of the apartments of public
and patrolled housing residents mark the beginning of traditional Fourth
Amendment protection for the home. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text. After crossing the threshold, residents find themselves
not within protected curtilage, but in spaces that, for all intents and
purposes, are the same as a public sidewalk. Of course, the similarities
between public sidewalks and common areas of multi-unit buildings are
limited.
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whether constitutional or statutory—can be drafted or interpreted in
two ways that will reduce the likelihood of abusive practices: rejecting
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atwater by narrowing arrest authority
to ban arrests for minor infractions, and decriminalizing minor
misconduct.291
With regard to arrest authority, states can make clear that arrests
for minor offenses are banned under state law. States can accomplish
this either legislatively, by enacting statutes that ban arrests, or
through state courts interpreting state constitutions to ban arrests for
minor offenses. Some state statutes already ban such arrests explicitly,
but it is more common for states to attempt decriminalization by
mandating that fines are the appropriate penalty rather than jail
time.292 With the latter approach, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Virginia v. Moore makes clear that merely limiting the punishment
options will not necessarily thwart arrests. As noted above, the Court
held there that the Fourth Amendment allowed an arrest for driving
with a suspended license even though Virginia law allowed only issuance
of a citation for that offense.293
Alternatively, state courts where state constitutional protections
for searches and seizures are not co-extensive with the Fourth
Amendment can limit arrest authority under state law.294 Specifically,
291. In accordance with the recommendations in Part IV.A, supra, states may
also interpret their state constitutions so that their respective Fourth
Amendment analogues bar stops for minor infractions and application of
the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.
292. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L.
Rev. 1055, 1079 (2015).
293. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“[T]he arrest rules that the
officers violated were those of state law alone, and . . . it is not the
province of the Fourth Amendment to enforce state law. That
Amendment does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained from a
constitutionally permissible arrest.”).
294. See, e.g., State v. Hardaway, 36 P.3d 900, 910 (Mont. 2001) (“[T]he range
of warrantless searches which may be lawfully conducted under the
Montana Constitution is narrower than the corresponding range of
searches that may be lawfully conducted pursuant to the federal Fourth
Amendment.”); State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266, 1275 (N.J. 2006) (noting
that the Supreme Court of New Jersey has “not hesitated [to] . . . afford
[New Jersey’s] citizens greater protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures under [the New Jersey Constitution] than would be the case
under its federal counterpart”); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 299 (N.Y.
1993) (rejecting extension of “plain view” exception to the warrant
requirement to encompass the “plain touch” of contraband under New
York Constitution); State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46, 48 (Wash. 2002)
(explaining that Washington Constitution’s protections against searches
and seizures are “qualitatively different from those provided by the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution”). In some states,
constitutional protection for searches and seizures is co-extensive with the

727

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019
When Stop and Frisk Comes Home

state constitutional protections can be interpreted to require the
suppression of arrests for minor misconduct and any evidence gathered
as a result of such arrests. Although the Fourth Amendment does not
bar such arrests, local and state authorities are bound by state
constitutional law and typically act accordingly.
C.

Local Laws and Policies

Policy change at the local level, by police departments, public
housing authorities, or local governments, is also available to reform
hyper-aggressive policing practices in public and patrolled housing.
Because most of these entities have direct policymaking authority over
the law enforcement agencies that patrol public and patrolled housing,
reform achieved at this level is likely to have the most immediate
impact.
First and foremost, police departments that work in public and
patrolled housing can choose to target public and patrolled housing only
when necessary. More specifically, they can adopt the proven hot spots
policing strategies that rely on rigorous data analysis to identify
locations that are actual hot spots. As noted above, public housing is
frequently subjected to outsized police attention because of stereotypes
about the people who live there.295 Contrary to this discriminatory
approach, police departments should embrace community policing or
problem-oriented policing models that have proven effective at
addressing crime without the collateral damage to the dignity,
autonomy, and freedom of law-abiding people who live in public and
patrolled housing.
Local governments, with the authority to regulate the law
enforcement agencies within their jurisdictions, can also require police
departments to undertake policing strategies that inflict the least harm
on Fourth Amendment interests in public and patrolled housing. This
approach may be particularly potent if local governments have
authority over local public housing authorities and similar entities that
can directly manage the scope of rules enforced by police.

Conclusion
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures offered
by the Fourth Amendment in public and patrolled housing does not
resemble that available to denizens of other locales. Such homes are not
impenetrable “castles” that law enforcement can breach only when
meeting stringent standards. Instead, largely because of the vast array
of behavior that is regulated in public and patrolled housing, law
enforcement officers have broad authority to stop, arrest, and search
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Macabeo, 384 P.3d 1189, 1212
(Cal. 2016) (noting limit on such protection under California law).
295. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
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people in and around such locations. When police focus their attention
on public and patrolled housing, whether through targeted programs or
hot spots strategies, the result is significant abrogation of the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents.
This Article should not be read to suggest that police officers act
in accordance with the full extent of their power in all situations. Police
officers have extraordinary discretion and often exercise it wisely. But,
as the New York City experience demonstrates, police practices that
exploit the full extent of police powers to stop, arrest, and search in
locations where mass criminalization is at work pose real risks to the
privacy and liberty rights that are supposed to be protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
Although reformers have called for the use of hot spots policing and
“smart policing” in response to evidence of police misconduct such as
programmatic stop and frisk, there are not significant limits on the
potential for abuse given the Fourth Amendment standards outlined
above. Even when these often-lauded strategies are implemented, police
may stop, arrest, and search with abandon. They also remain free to
rely on pernicious stereotypes. In short, for people like the residents of
public and patrolled housing developments that are a bullseye for law
enforcement, a focus on hot spots does not offer relief from the harms
of programmatic stop-and-frisk and similar Broken Windows policies.
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